

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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COMMUNIST THREAT TO PEACE IN TAIWAN AREA • <i>Report by President Eisenhower</i>	481
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEP- TEMBER 9	485
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE PRESERVA- TION OF PEACE • <i>by Under Secretary Herter</i>	494
THE UNITED NATIONS: THE ROAD AHEAD • <i>by As- sistant Secretary Wilcox</i>	506
THE CHALLENGE OF THE TIMES • <i>by G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor</i>	514
PRESIDENT CORRECTS SOVIET MISSTATEMENTS ON TAIWAN SITUATION • <i>Exchange of Cor- respondence Between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev.</i>	498

For index see inside back cover

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Communist Threat to Peace in Taiwan Area

*Report by President Eisenhower*¹

My friends: Tonight I want to talk to you about the situation, dangerous to peace, which has developed in the Formosa Straits in the Far East. My purpose is to give you its basic facts and then my conclusions as to our Nation's proper course of action.

To begin, let us remember that traditionally this country and its Government have always been passionately devoted to peace with honor, as they are now. We shall never resort to force in settlement of differences except when compelled to do so to defend against aggression and to protect our vital interests.

This means that, in our view, negotiations and conciliation should never be abandoned in favor of force and strife. While we shall never timidly retreat before the threat of armed aggression, we would welcome in the present circumstances negotiations that could have a fruitful result in preserving the peace of the Formosa area and reaching a solution that could be acceptable to all parties concerned, including, of course, our ally, the Republic of China.

Bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu

On the morning of August 23d the Chinese Communists opened a severe bombardment of Quemoy, an island in the Formosa Straits off the China coast. Another island in the same area, Matsu, was also attacked. These two islands have always been a part of Free China—never under Communist control.

This bombardment of Quemoy has been going on almost continuously ever since. Also, Chinese

Communists have been using their naval craft to try to break up the supplying of Quemoy with its 125,000 people. Their normal source of supply is by sea from Formosa, where the Government of Free China is now located.

Chinese Communists say that they will capture Quemoy. So far they have not actually attempted a landing, but their bombardment has caused great damage. Over 1,000 people have been killed or wounded. In large part these are civilians.

This is a tragic affair. It is shocking that in this day and age naked force should be used for such aggressive purposes.

But this is not the first time that the Chinese Communists have acted in this way.

In 1950 they attacked and tried to conquer the Republic of Korea. At that time President Truman announced the intention of protecting Formosa, the principal area still held by Free China, because of the belief that Formosa's safety was vital to the security of the United States and the free world. Our Government has adhered firmly ever since 1950 to that policy.

In 1953 and 1954 the Chinese Communists took an active part in the war in Indochina against Viet-Nam.

In the fall of 1954 they attacked Quemoy and Matsu, the same two islands they are attacking now. They broke off that attack when, in January 1955, the Congress and I agreed that we should firmly support Free China.²

Since then, for about 4 years, Chinese Communists have not used force for aggressive purposes. We have achieved an armistice in Korea

¹ Made to the American people over radio and television from the White House on Sept. 11.

² For background and text of the joint resolution on the defense of Formosa, see BULLETIN of Feb. 7, 1955, p. 211.

which stopped the fighting there in 1953. There is a 1954 armistice in Viet-Nam; and since 1955 there has been quiet in the Formosa Straits area. We had hoped that the Chinese Communists were becoming peaceful—but it seems not.

So the world is again faced with the problem of armed aggression. Powerful dictatorships are attacking an exposed, but free, area.

What should we do?

Shall we take the position that, submitting to threat, it is better to surrender pieces of free territory in the hope that this will satisfy the appetite of the aggressor and we shall have peace?

Do we not still remember that the name of "Munich" symbolizes a vain hope of appeasing dictators?

At that time the policy of appeasement was tried, and it failed. Prior to the Second World War, Mussolini seized Ethiopia. In the Far East Japanese warlords were grabbing Manchuria by force. Hitler sent his armed forces into the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles Treaty. Then he annexed little Austria. When he got away with that, he next turned to Czechoslovakia and began taking it bit by bit.

In the face of all these attacks on freedom by the dictators, the powerful democracies stood aside. It seemed that Ethiopia and Manchuria were too far away and too unimportant to fight about. In Europe appeasement was looked upon as the way to peace. The democracies felt that, if they tried to stop what was going on, that would mean war. But, because of these repeated retreats, war came just the same.

If the democracies had stood firm at the beginning, almost surely there would have been no World War. Instead they gave such an appearance of weakness and timidity that aggressive rulers were encouraged to overrun one country after another. In the end the democracies saw that their very survival was at stake. They had no alternative but to turn and fight in what proved to be the most terrible war that the world has ever known.

I know something about that war, and I never want to see that history repeated. But, my fellow Americans, it certainly can be repeated if the peace-loving democratic nations again fearfully practice a policy of standing idly by while big aggressors use armed force to conquer the small and weak.

Let us suppose that the Chinese Communists conquer Quemoy. Would that be the end of the story? We know that it would not be the end of the story. History teaches that, when powerful despots can gain something through aggression, they try, by the same methods, to gain more and more and more.

Also, we have more to guide us than the teachings of history. We have the statements, the boastings, of the Chinese Communists themselves. They frankly say that their present military effort is part of a program to conquer Formosa.

It is as certain as can be that the shooting which the Chinese Communists started on August 23d had as its purpose not just the taking of the island of Quemoy. It is part of what is indeed an ambitious plan of armed conquest.

This plan would liquidate all of the free-world positions in the Western Pacific area and bring them under captive governments which would be hostile to the United States and the free world. Thus the Chinese and Russian Communists would come to dominate at least the western half of the now friendly Pacific Ocean.

So aggression by ruthless despots again imposes a clear danger to the United States and to the free world.

In this effort the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union appear to be working hand in hand. Last Monday I received a long letter on this subject from Prime Minister Khrushchev.³ He warned the United States against helping its allies in the Western Pacific. He said that we should not support the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. He contended that we should desert them, return all of our naval forces to our home bases, and leave our friends in the Far East to face, alone, the combined military power of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Does Mr. Khrushchev think that we have so soon forgotten Korea?

I must say to you very frankly and soberly, my friends, the United States cannot accept the result that the Communists seek. Neither can we show, now, a weakness of purpose—a timidity—which would surely lead them to move more aggressively against us and our friends in the Western Pacific area.

³ For text of the Soviet letter and the President's reply, see p. 498.

If the Chinese Communists have decided to risk a war, it is not because Quemoy itself is so valuable to them. They have been getting along without Quemoy ever since they seized the China mainland 9 years ago.

If they have now decided to risk a war, it can only be because they, and their Soviet allies, have decided to find out whether threatening war is a policy from which they can make big gains.

If that is their decision, then a Western Pacific "Munich" would not buy us peace or security. It would encourage the aggressors. It would dismay our friends and allies there. If history teaches anything, appeasement would make it more likely that we would have to fight a major war.

Security of Western Pacific Vital to U. S.

Congress has made clear its recognition that the security of the Western Pacific is vital to the security of the United States and that we should be firm. The Senate has ratified, by overwhelming vote, security treaties with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and also the Republic of Korea. We have a mutual security treaty with the Republic of the Philippines, which could be next in line for conquest if Formosa fell into hostile hands. These treaties commit the United States to the defense of the treaty areas. In addition, there is a joint resolution which the Congress passed in January 1955 dealing specifically with Formosa and the offshore islands of Free China in the Formosa Straits.

At that time the situation was similar to what it is today.

Congress then voted the President authority to employ the armed forces of the United States for the defense not only of Formosa but of related positions, such as Quemoy and Matsu, if I believed their defense to be appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa.

I might add that the mandate from the Congress was given by an almost unanimous bipartisan vote.

Today, the Chinese Communists announce, repeatedly and officially, that their military operations against Quemoy are preliminary to attack on Formosa. So it is clear that the Formosa Straits resolution of 1955 applies to the present situation.

If the present bombardment and harassment of Quemoy should be converted into a major assault,

with which the local defenders could not cope, then we would be compelled to face precisely the situation that Congress visualized in 1955.

I have repeatedly sought to make clear our position in this matter so that there would not be danger of Communist miscalculation. The Secretary of State on September 4th made a statement to the same end.⁴ This statement could not, of course, cover every contingency. Indeed, I interpret the joint resolution as requiring me not to make absolute advance commitments but to use my judgment according to the circumstances of the time. But the statement did carry a clear meaning to the Chinese Communists and to the Soviet Union. There will be no retreat in the face of armed aggression, which is part and parcel of a continuing program of using armed force to conquer new regions.

I do not believe that the United States can be either lured or frightened into appeasement. I believe that, in taking the position of opposing aggression by force, I am taking the only position which is consistent with the vital interests of the United States and, indeed, with the peace of the world.

Some misguided persons have said that Quemoy is nothing to become excited about. They said the same about South Korea—about Viet-Nam, about Lebanon.

Now I assure you that no American boy will be asked by me to fight *just* for Quemoy. But those who make up our armed forces—and I believe the American people as a whole—do stand ready to defend the principle that armed force shall not be used for aggressive purposes.

Upon observance of that principle depends a lasting and just peace. It is that same principle that protects the Western Pacific free-world positions as well as the security of our homeland. If we are not ready to defend this principle, then indeed tragedy after tragedy would befall us.

Prospect for Negotiation

But there is a far better way than resort to force to settle these differences, and there is some hope that such a better way may be followed.

That is the way of negotiation.

That way is open and prepared because in 1955

⁴ BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1958, p. 445.

arrangements were made between the United States and the Chinese Communists that an ambassador on each side would be authorized to discuss at Geneva certain problems of common concern. These included the matter of release of American civilians imprisoned in Communist China and such questions as the renunciation of force in the Formosa area. There have been 73 meetings since August 1955.

When our ambassador, who was conducting these negotiations, was recently transferred to another post, we named as successor Mr. [Jacob D.] Beam, our Ambassador to Poland. The Chinese Communists were notified accordingly the latter part of July, but there was no response.

The Secretary of State, in his September 4th statement, referred to these Geneva negotiations. Two days later, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Premier of the People's Republic of China, proposed that these talks should be resumed "in the interests of peace." This was followed up on September 8th by Mr. Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the People's Republic of China. We promptly welcomed this prospect and instructed our Ambassador at Warsaw to be ready immediately to resume these talks. We expect that the talks will begin upon the return to Warsaw of the Chinese Communist Ambassador, who has been in Peiping.

Perhaps our suggestion may be bearing fruit. We devoutly hope so.

Naturally, the United States will adhere to the position it first took in 1955, that we will not in these talks be a party to any arrangements which would prejudice rights of our ally, the Republic of China.

We know by hard experiences that the Chinese Communist leaders are indeed militant and aggressive. But we cannot believe that they would now persist in a course of military aggression which would threaten world peace, with all that would be involved. We believe that diplomacy can and should find a way out. There are measures that can be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn in the side of peace. We believe that arrangements are urgently required to stop gunfire and to pave the way to a peaceful solution.

If the bilateral talks between ambassadors do not fully succeed, there is still the hope that the

United Nations could exert a peaceful influence on the situation.

In 1955 the hostilities of the Chinese Communists in the Formosa area were brought before the United Nations Security Council. But the Chinese Communists rejected its jurisdiction.⁵ They said that they were entitled to Formosa and the offshore islands and that, if they used armed force to get them, that was purely a "civil war" and that the United Nations had no right to concern itself.

They claimed also that the attack by the Communist north Koreans on south Korea was "civil war" and that the United Nations and the United States were "aggressors" because they helped south Korea. They said the same about their attack on Viet-Nam.

I feel sure that these pretexts will never deceive or control world opinion. The fact is that Communist Chinese hostilities in the Formosa Straits area do endanger world peace. I do not believe that any rulers, however aggressive they may be, will flout efforts to find a peaceful and honorable solution, whether it be by direct negotiations or through the United Nations.

My friends, we are confronted with a serious situation. But it is typical of the security problems of the world today. Powerful and aggressive forces are constantly probing, now here, now there, to see whether the free world is weakening. In the face of this there are no easy choices available. It is misleading for anyone to imply that there are.

However, the present situation, though serious, is by no means desperate or hopeless.

There is not going to be any appeasement.

I believe that there is not going to be any war.

But there must be sober realization by the American people that our legitimate purposes are again being tested by those who threaten peace and freedom everywhere.

This has not been the first test for us and for the free world. Probably it will not be the last. But as we meet each test with courage and unity, we contribute to the safety and the honor of our beloved land—and to the cause of a just and lasting peace.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 251.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 9

Press release 524 dated September 9

Secretary Dulles: I will be glad to receive your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Army Chief of Information is quoted by the Associated Press this morning as having said that the decision to aid the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu was unanimous on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would appear to be the first official statement by a Government official of such a decision. Is that correct?

A. That it is the first such statement?

Q. By anyone on the record.

A. Well, I don't quite get the purport of your question.

Q. Well, the purport of the question is, has the United States made a decision to help Chiang Kai-shek defend Quemoy and Matsu?

A. It has made the decision reported in the statement which I made at Newport on September 4 with the authority of the President.¹ That is the only such decision taken.

Q. But in that statement, as I recall it, you said that the President had taken no decision.

A. I think that the statement is replete with decisions. There was no definitive decision because, as the statement pointed out, certain of the facts could not be known in advance of the event. But certainly that statement was a significant statement. It has been so interpreted, at least, by the Chinese Communists and by the Soviet Union. Certainly they see significance in the statement.

Q. Well, if the United States has taken such a decision, why does not the Government say so publicly and officially?

A. Because the President has not taken any such

decision. There was, if the statement is correct that you quote from—there have been views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But, under the joint resolution,² it is not the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have the authority to take a final decision; it is the President.

Q. Could we move that question just one step closer to the area, Mr. Secretary? The dispatches reporting the military action in the strait yesterday, which involved the blowing up of a Nationalist ammunition ship, made the point that the escorting American vessels withheld their fire. Can you tell us under what orders the American escort vessels are maneuvering in the strait with regard to withholding their fire and what would happen if a Chinese Communist shell hit an American ship?

A. I cannot tell you what would happen. It would depend a great deal upon the circumstances—whether it was an accidental hit or if it was a deliberate hit. If it was a deliberate assault upon an American vessel in what we regard as the high seas, then there would presumably be the same type of reaction that there would be, and indeed has been, when there have been attacks on American planes in the international air. If it is judged to be an accidental affair, that would be another matter again.

Q. Well, on the first part, if it was a deliberate assault—you sort of left the hypothesis up in the air—what would happen if it was a deliberate assault?

A. I imagine, if there were a deliberate attack upon a United States naval craft in international waters, that it would reply in some way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you the high official at Newport the other day who interpreted the President's statement after it was released?

² H. J. Res. 159, 84th Cong., 1st sess.; for text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 213.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1958, p. 445.

A. I had what was supposed to be, under the rules that were laid down when I had the meeting, a background conference there. I realize now that you cannot always have a "background" conference with compliance with the rules.

Q. So you were the official, sir?

A. I was.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers

Q. Mr. Secretary, you invited the 20 Latin American foreign ministers to meet here on September 23 and 24. Can you tell us what you hope will come out of that conference, what you hope it will achieve?

A. I think the conference will probably deal with several matters that are related to the closer cooperation of the American Republics in terms, perhaps, of more significant and frequent meetings of the foreign ministers, in terms of the operation which has been initiated by President Kubitschek and called "Operation Pan-America," and in terms of the decision by the United States to be willing to cooperate with a regional financial institution for the Americas.³ I imagine all of these matters and perhaps others will be discussed. The meeting is informal, no fixed agenda, no desire to reach any formal decisions. It is a further step in our constant efforts to bring about closer cooperation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Democrats in the State of Maine registered what is being called their biggest political victory in that State in nearly 50 years. One of the points that Governor Muskie, the successful candidate for the Senate, used in his campaign was an attack on the administration's foreign policy. What is your comment on that situation? Do you think that this is a rebuke, a repudiation by the people of the State of Maine of your foreign policy?

A. I would doubt it very much, because our foreign policy in all its essential aspects has been and will be bipartisan. I would be greatly sur-

prised if that were the correct interpretation of the election.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, would you say that you have had bipartisan support for the reported decision of the United States to defend Quemoy and Matsu in the case of an invasion attempt? I ask this question in the light of the remarks of former Secretary Acheson over the weekend.

A. Well, of course, we are acting here under authority which was conferred by a joint resolution, adopted under circumstances very parallel to those that exist today. There were in opposition to that resolution only 6 votes, 3 in the House and 3 in the Senate. That indicates, I think, great unanimity and great bipartisanship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comment on Mr. Acheson's statement, particularly that part of it in which he said that the United States is drifting into war with China without friends and allies and has lost control of the China situation, at the mercies of both the Nationalists and the Communists as to whether or not we get involved or whether we have to back down?

A. No; I have no comment on that.

Chinese Nationalist Military Buildup on Quemoy and Matsu

Q. Mr. Secretary, after the passage of the Formosa resolution, did this country do anything to encourage the Chinese Nationalists to build up their forces on the Quemoy in a formal or an informal way?

A. I think not. My distinct impression is that the decision to build up the defensive strength on Quemoy and Matsu was taken by the Chinese Nationalist Republic—the Republic of China—and that that was not urged or encouraged by the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this then mean that the Chinese Nationalist Government violated the intent of the exchange of notes between yourself and Foreign Minister Yeh?⁴

A. Not at all.

Q. It provides that there will be no significant depletion of the defensive strength on Formosa

³For a statement by Under Secretary Dillon on an Inter-American regional development institution, see *ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 347.

⁴For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1955, p. 152.

and the Pescadores of the forces which jointly support it.

A. There was no violation there. It is one thing to say did we encourage it or promote it, and it is another thing to say did we oppose it. After all, the Republic of China is a sovereign Government. It is not a puppet of ours. It has a normal right to take decisions of its own. It is one thing to say, as I did, that we did not promote or encourage this thing. It is a different thing again to say that we did not actively oppose it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it was wise to have stood by while the buildup occurred on these islands?

A. Yes; I think it was.

Q. In what respect?

A. That the attempt by the United States to impose its will in that respect upon the Republic of China would have had very unfortunate consequences. It would have weakened the defensive posture of the United States in the entire area. I must emphasize that this situation in that part of the world is not an isolated situation. You cannot isolate it and say that the only problem involved here is Quemoy and Matsu. What is involved, and what is under threat, is the entire position of the United States and that of its free-world allies in the Western Pacific, extending from Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, on down to Southeast Asia. That is what is under attack. That is of vital interest to the United States. And we have to conduct ourselves in relation to that situation, not as though little bits of it could be segregated and treated as isolated problems to be dealt with entirely on their own. We have to maintain good will and good relations and the morale of the governments that are our friends and allies in that part of the world. Those factors have to be taken into account and not purely military dispositions.

Question of Revising Security Treaty With Japan

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the Formosa situation, do you think it is advisable or necessary to revise our security treaty with Japan? I believe that you are going to discuss this with Foreign Minister Fujiyama this weekend or in the next few days.

A. Well, we look forward very much to these discussions with Foreign Minister Fujiyama, who will be here tomorrow. We will discuss in a sympathetic and cooperative way any problems that he wants to lay before us, and those problems may include some discussion of this treaty. I do not think that the discussion of the security treaty with Japan is in any immediate sense related to the problem of Taiwan. It relates to the generally changed situation as a result of the fact that Japan is now in a somewhat different position from what it was when the original security treaty was made in the sense that at that time it had no security forces of its own.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, when you were writing the Japanese peace treaty in 1951, it was your premise that the Japanese trade imbalance, the dollar gap, could be met by American aid and military spending pending developments through forces in China which would release South China from the Communist yoke, and this was reflected in your 1952 foreign-policy plank espousing liberation instead of containment. Is the present policy in the Formosa Straits predicated on the expectation that the area of China south of the Yangtze should break away from the Peking Communist rule in the not-too-distant future?

A. My views in that respect are most recently set forth, I think, in the speech which I made in San Francisco about a year ago.⁵ We do not consider that the Chinese Communists' hold upon the mainland is to be accepted as a permanent fact of life and one of these inevitable things which we all have to accept and give way to. If there is any one thing in the world that is inevitable, it is that human beings want for themselves a degree of personal freedom and liberty which is denied by communism. So I believe that it is inevitable, sooner or later, that that desire for personal freedom will manifest itself. Therefore we do not accept the type of Communist rule that now prevails as a permanent situation anywhere in the world.

Significance of 3-Mile Limit

Q. Mr. Secretary, the U.S. warships in the Formosa Straits are convoying the Nationalist

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1957, p. 91.

ships to within 3 miles of Quemoy. Can you tell us, sir, what the significance of this 3-mile limit is? Is it the Nationalist Chinese limit or the Red China limit?

A. That decision was taken while I was away, and I was not a participant in the discussions which led up to it. My understanding is that there were two elements that were involved in the decision. One was that to conduct what might appear to be combat activities within the 3-mile limit around Matsu and Quemoy might involve a decision, or require a decision, under the joint resolution. The other was that as a practical matter, I believe, our ships can operate on that basis without any material risk of coming under the fire of the shore batteries.

Q. Sir, on the point about whose 3-mile limit it is, then, you are not paying any attention, I gather, to the territorial claims of the Red Chinese or even to the use of a limit around Quemoy and Matsu.

A. No, the 3-mile limit referred to is the 3-mile limit which represents the territorial waters of the Republic of China around Quemoy and Matsu. We do not accept from the Chinese Communists or anybody else, for that matter, the extension of territorial waters to 12 miles. That is what you might call a "grab." It cannot be effected unilaterally by any nation any more than it can grab territory.

Ambassadorial Talks With Chinese Communists

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States doing anything now to try to get the ambassadorial talks going with Red China in Warsaw? Both sides have agreed?

A. Yes, we communicated at 10 o'clock this morning, Warsaw time, a message to the Communist Ambassador, Mr. Wang, who has conducted these talks in the past, the notice that we were prepared to carry forward the talks in line with the suggestion made by Mr. Chou En-lai and which was welcomed by the White House statement of Saturday.*

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to come of these talks? What do you hope will come out of them?

* *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 446.

A. We hope that out of the talks will come, as a minimum, a *modus vivendi* which will assure that the issues there will not be resolved by recourse to force. If the issues themselves could be resolved, that would be a very good result, but that perhaps is too much to hope. I do not think it is too much to hope that there can be a *modus vivendi* or a "cease-fire" agreement reached which would assure that issues would not be resolved by violent, aggressive action which would risk world war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did we name a date on which we would like to see the talks begin?

A. We said that we stood ready to resume the talks at any time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would that cease-fire *modus vivendi* require the renunciation of force that we requested for so many meetings and which the Chinese did not agree to?

A. It might be along those lines, or it might be perhaps along more detailed or specific lines and not quite so much in terms of generalities. But we do not have any particular position in that matter which I want to discuss here, even before we know what the position of the Chinese Communists is. You will recall that it was they who suggested the resumption of these talks.

U.S. Considers "Civil War" Aspect Unrealistic

Q. The reason I asked, sir, is that the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists both take the position that this is a civil war, and I would like to know what our position is on that. Do we consider this whole affair a civil war among the Chinese?

A. We consider that, although there are elements of a civil war, there are also international aspects of the situation. You may recall that, at the time of the Korean war, it was the position of the Soviet Union that that was purely a civil war between two factions of the Koreans that were fighting each other and, therefore, the United Nations had no right to intervene, the United States had no right to intervene, and the United Nations and the United States by intervening were "aggressors." That was their position in regard to Korea—the same position that they take here. We do not accept that view. We did not accept it as regards Korea; we did not

accept it as regards the situation that exists around Taiwan. Indeed, it would be utterly unrealistic to accept that view because, whatever the theory of it may be, everybody knows that there are in this situation elements which could lead to an international war. Therefore, to treat this as purely an internal civil strife is quite unrealistic and is just as unacceptable to the United States as the similar position was unacceptable at the time of the Korean war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does that indicate any intention to take this matter before the Security Council?

A. Well, you may recall that an effort was made to take it to the Security Council in 1955⁷ and the Chinese Communists refused to respond to an invitation from the Security Council on the ground that it was a purely internal matter and debarred from consideration under provisions of article 2 (7) of the charter, which says that matters that are essentially of domestic jurisdiction should not be considered by the Security Council. All they have said in recent days indicates that they would adhere to that position. That does not mean that efforts may not be made, and usefully made, in the United Nations to deal with what is obviously, I think, a threat to the peace. Just as in Korea the United Nations dealt with it despite the argument that it was a purely domestic matter, it may usefully be dealt with again. But, as I say, the Chinese Communists, at least, have taken the position consistently, and adhered to the position, that they would not admit the right of the United Nations to deal with the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could it be dealt with in the General Assembly beginning next week, or would it have to go first to the Security Council?

A. That would depend, I think, upon the form that the action took. If it was not pending before the Security Council as a threat to peace, then I think there would be no reason why it could not at least be discussed in the General Assembly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any assurance, sir, that the other allies, other than Nationalist China, would support you in the event that you got involved in a war with Communist China in the Formosa Straits?

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 251.

A. Well, we have not either sought or obtained any such assurances because I do not believe that there will be a war if we stand firm and united on this proposition. I would say this: that I find very general agreement among not only our allies but among so-called neutralists to the proposition that, whatever may be the merits of this case, it ought not to be resolved by recourse to force. They believe that the effort of the Chinese Communists to take by force what they regard as their territory, but which has never been in their possession, is an offense and that whatever, as I say, the substantive merits may be, that ought not to be tolerated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the statement which Mr. Khrushchev handed to President Eisenhower yesterday?

A. A comment has already been issued from Newport⁸ about that statement which is perhaps all that should be said at the present time, unless there is some specific aspect of the rather rambling letter to which you wanted to direct my attention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thus far the Chinese Communists in attacking the Quemoy area confined themselves to shelling. They have built up substantial air strength along the coastal airfields there. Could you tell us what reaction could be expected if a Chinese bomber were to bomb the Nationalist positions on Quemoy? My question is, would we, under our understanding with the Chinese Nationalists, feel that a Chinese Nationalist air attack against the airfield from which this plane took off would be justified?

A. I doubt that it is wise for me to answer that question. It is quite obvious we have given that problem consideration, but I don't think it is in the national interest to give here an explicit reply to that question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think Nasser's support of Red China is an indication of increasing sympathy by the United Arab Republic for Communist causes?

A. It is difficult to interpret the mood or the reasoning that lies behind such a position. We do know, of course, that the United Arab Republic has obtained a good deal of support, particularly support in terms of military equipment, from the

⁸ See p. 499.

Sino-Soviet bloc and probably expects to get more. That may be an explanation of the position.

U.S. Position on Defending the Offshore Islands

Q. Mr. Secretary, your big argument for the Formosa resolution 2 years ago was that past wars had been caused by the failure of great powers to make absolutely clear where they would fight. In the light of that would you explain to us why you think it is still wise not to make our intentions crystal clear about the offshore islands and to continue the guessing game?

A. The position which I took, I think, at the time of the resolution and, indeed, the terms of the resolution itself make perfectly clear that the United States is to defend Taiwan and the Penghus. It also makes clear that it was the wish of the Congress that, if the President found that related areas should be defended as part of that effort, then he should defend them. Now in the nature of the case the President cannot, under the terms of the resolution, and, indeed, under the terms of our treaty, make an absolute decision in that respect. You may recall that the treaty that we have covers only Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghus (the Pescadores). At the time of the ratification of that treaty we pointed out that, if further area was to be brought under that treaty, we would go back to Congress—the Senate—and ask for an amendment of the treaty. Therefore, it is quite clear, and, I think, had been made clear from the beginning of this affair, that the offshore islands are not to be defended as such by the United States. If they are involved in what is in effect an attack upon areas which we are bound to defend, namely, Taiwan and the Penghus, then we will meet that attack at that point. But we cannot just say, through Presidential action, that we will defend, come what may, under any and all circumstances, an area which is beyond that to which we are committed by the treaty. This can be done only if there is an actual relationship between the two at the time in question. I think that was made very clear at the time of the adoption of the resolution. I made it clear in many press conferences back in 1955, and it is the same situation today as it was at that time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the Chinese Communists' radio, in talking about Que-

moy and Formosa, makes no distinction separating Quemoy from the eventual plan to liberate Formosa, if there were to be an attack, say today, would you think that everything added up to a decision to go ahead and help defend Quemoy on the grounds that it is essential to the defense of Formosa?

A. I think you can guess the answer to that if you read the statement of September 4. I don't want to add to or subtract from that statement, but I think it is pretty clear in that respect. The statement pointed out the reasons why the President could not now make a decision. It implied that, if those reasons no longer existed, then he would not hesitate to make the decision. But there could be changes in the situation, and I don't want to read into that statement more than is there, because I think there is plenty there.

Alerting the Congress and the Public to the Danger

Q. Mr. Secretary, on two occasions this morning you referred to the possibility of war with China. In the light of that, is there not an obligation to consult with the Congress in some way or another, and is there not an obligation to tell the people of this country just what the possibilities and dangers of bombardment are here in response to Mr. [John] Scali's [of the Associated Press] question?

A. Let me say that efforts have been made, very considerable efforts have been made, to make contact with congressional leaders. It's not easy to do that at the present time when they are scattered about the country. But through telephone, where possible through private talks, and through written communications there have been contacts made with the congressional leaders.

As far as the country is concerned, it seems to me that the country is pretty well alerted to the danger, as I judge by reading the headlines of the newspapers and listening in on the radio. Of course the vital point is—I think it is understood, though perhaps it should be made more understood—what is at stake there is not just two pieces of real estate, Quemoy and Matsu. Obviously, if that was all that was involved, there would be no basis for action on the part of the United States. What's involved there is the whole position, as I pointed out earlier, of the free world in the Western Pacific; and the vital interests of the United States are involved.

Now, there are always some people who argue that, if you fall back from an advanced position, then you are in a stronger position to hold the rest. But also it may be that, if you fall back from advanced positions and indicate to an aggressor that you have no will to stand, your position becomes weaker, your allies lose confidence in you. That situation, I think, has been portrayed. There is, I believe, realization—and I think during the coming days there will be increasing realization—of the fact that what's at stake there are the vital interests of the United States as well as the basic principle upon which world order is founded, which is that violence, force, shall not be used to acquire additional territory.

Now, if we recede in that respect, I firmly believe that the United States is in much increased danger, that our allies will be much less dependable or feel that we are not dependable, and that there will have been a grave damage done to the security interests of the United States and to world order.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that very point, the Wall Street Journal yesterday carried a very long lead article reporting that many Americans were either confused by, or opposed to, your Formosan policy, or both. How important is the reaction of the public on one side or another to the implementation of the policy that this Government is now pursuing, and what ingredients in public opinion might you accept as having an influence on that policy?

A. I, of course, recognize that it is essential that a policy which involves taking grave decisions of this kind should, so far as practical, have the support of the American people. But also I am aware of the fact that the elements which go into making final decisions are so delicate, oftentimes not subject to public appraisal, that there lies a responsibility upon the President and his principal advisers which cannot be shared with the general public.

Now, this matter has been studied very intensively over many years because this situation today is almost an exact replica of the situation that existed about 4 years ago. It's basically nothing new. The elements of the problem have been weighed. Of course there may be some new factors that have come into it in certain respects. The attitude

of the Chinese Communists may have changed somewhat. The attitude of the Soviet Union may have changed somewhat. Constant reappraisals are necessary in that respect. But many of the elements of this situation, that go to make up the decision, are extremely delicate and difficult. I think that there is no difference of opinion at all among the principal advisers of the President, both political and military, as to the essential elements of the equation or as to what, given certain circumstances, the response ought to be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the elements are essentially the same now as they were 4 years ago, why was it that the surrender or the evacuation of the Tachen Islands in 1955 did not also represent a serious threat to our position in the Western Pacific?

A. Because it could have been done, and was done, under circumstances which in fact did not involve that threat. The facts speak for themselves, that our analysis of that situation was correct. I believe our analysis of this situation is also correct.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before that it was not necessary to have consultations with our allies on the possibility of war breaking out in the Formosa area, and later you said you nevertheless regarded that a united stand was essential for the success of our policy. I was wondering how can we achieve this united stand without thorough consultation with the allies?

A. I think that, where I spoke about the "united" stand, that was directed primarily to the internal domestic situation, not to the international situation.

Q. No, sir, the question dealt with the international situation.

A. Well, I then was misunderstood. I do not believe that we should seek to require that all of our allies should agree with everything we do in an area of the world where we have the primary responsibility. I believe that it is desirable that they should do so. I believe that, as they increasingly understand the situation, they will do so. But there cannot be an adequate discharge of our responsibilities if, in an area like this, where we have the treaty obligations, where we have the force, where others do not, that we just say we will

not do anything unless all of some 45 allies agree with us. That would not be a position which would admit of effective, responsible action.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how is the Little Rock and Virginia integration story affecting United States prestige abroad?

A. Well, I think that incidents like that are never conducive to one's prestige abroad.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in past instances, where there were threats to the peace, such as in Korea, the Middle East, and Hungary, we did not hesitate going to the United Nations. In this instance why don't we rush to the U.N. to take this Formosa Straits case before one of the bodies?

A. Well, the principal reason, I think, why we do not "rush" to the United Nations is, first, that the Chinese Communists have put us on notice of the fact that they will not accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations; secondly, the Chinese Communists have proposed another method of dealing with this matter, namely, ambassadorial talks. Now, if there are two methods you have to choose from, one of which they reject in advance, the other of which they propose, it seems to me more sensible to take the one that they propose.

Possibility of Negotiating With Communists

Q. Mr. Secretary, one urgent question. If the Red Chinese renounce the use of force, are you prepared to negotiate the future of the offshore islands, that is Quemoy and Matsu?

A. Well, the United States is not in a position to negotiate the future of property which it does not own and which belongs to another and friendly government. All I can say is that, if there were an effective, dependable renunciation of force, it would be certainly a very constructive new element in the situation which might have further consequences.

Q. What can be negotiated then, Mr. Secretary? What can be negotiated if force is given up, in your opinion?

A. Well, there is quite a lot to negotiate. But I don't think it's desirable that I should try to express here all that we have in mind for possible

negotiations with the Chinese Communists. They have not exposed their hand as yet.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it a fair understanding of what you have been saying that you and the President regard the threat of aggression in Quemoy and Matsu equal to the threat to the Western World as in the case of Korea and that there, as we were prepared to resist aggression, we are again prepared to resist aggression?

A. I think the two situations are comparable. Perhaps Berlin also is another example of a forward position which it was judged could not be lost in the face of a frontal attack without consequences which were unacceptable to the United States and, I think, to the free world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it a fair interpretation of what you have been saying about the potential negotiations with the Chinese that we are changing our position or were willing to change our position to a considerable degree, that is to move from the only two points which we sought to negotiate before, the release of the Americans and the renunciation of force? You imply that we have a number of papers in our bag which you don't want to disclose in advance. What I'm trying to get at is, are they matters of substance that you are prepared to give us?

A. The things I am talking about are matters which relate to the use of force or the disuse of force in the Taiwan Straits area. But I think the matter can perhaps be dealt with in a more specific way rather than in abstract generalities and that it might not be useful to repeat the ritual of the last 3 years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the future of Quemoy and Matsu and the question asked earlier, if the Red Chinese were prepared to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Straits, would the United States then be prepared to recommend to the Nationalist Chinese that they evacuate Quemoy and Matsu?

A. I don't want to go any further than what I have said, namely, that, if there were a meaningful renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits area, that would alter the situation in a great many respects and probably have consequences. But I don't want to attempt to say precisely what those consequences would be because they involve the rights and interests of an ally.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Finance Minister of India saw you yesterday. In that connection is the United States willing to help India meet its foreign-exchange gap over the next 2½ years?

A. The United States is willing now, as in the past, to help in that respect. We are not willing to assume the burden entirely ourselves. It should be and will be, I think, a cooperative effort. But I believe that, through the combined efforts of many countries, this new crisis will be tided over.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a factual point—did we ever convoy Nationalist ships before this time?

A. I recall that we convoyed the Chinese Nationalists for a period during the height of the activities incurred in the late fall of 1954.

Q. I'm still troubled about this point of the obligation of the Government to the people on this question of convoying into an area of lively shelling. Is it your position that we have no obligation to explain that, that the Executive can take that responsibility on its own without explaining?

A. Well, I thought I was doing a little explaining here today. If not, I have failed in my purpose.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have barely mentioned the Middle East. Has the situation in Lebanon progressed in our view to a point to indicate a withdrawal of United States troops?

A. I don't think that the developments, as yet, indicate a total withdrawal at any date which we could now fix. The situation does seem to be improving. There could be some retraction, reduction of forces there, I believe. But I think it would be premature to announce, I know it would be premature to announce, any definitive plans for total withdrawal.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Bullis To Be Chairman of IDAB

The White House on August 28 announced the recess appointment by the President of Harry A. Bullis to be chairman of the International Development Advisory Board.

President Opens U.S. Exhibit on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Following is the text of remarks recorded by President Eisenhower and relayed by radio to Geneva on September 1 on the occasion of the opening of the U.S. exhibit at the Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated August 31

It gives me real pleasure to participate in this transatlantic opening of the United States exhibit. This display is further tangible evidence of the determination of my country to advance the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind.

At the first United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1955, we charted some of the paths along which we believed this new science would advance. I recall a visit to that exhibition a few days before its formal opening, and I shared with you the hopes in the great promise which science offered and continues to offer. We have made great strides since the summer of 1955.

Now, 3 years later, we will see here in graphic demonstration for scientists and laymen alike examples of some of the ways in which the atom is already being made to serve humanity. A few weeks ago I was shown a scale model of our exhibit, and I know that the demonstrations will be both impressive and informative.

Also, I find it gratifying that so many nations are joining in this Conference and exhibition. A number of them will also have remarkable exhibits. I wish it were possible for me to see them all.

There should be a fruitful exchange of views on the new scientific advances. My country, which initiated the project of this scientific conference, will continue to share its resources and knowledge with other countries to the end that the fullest benefits of nuclear energy may be enjoyed by all.

Surely all nations, all technically trained people, the United Nations organization itself, and all who participate in this Conference will continue to press forward to transform this great natural force from an instrument of destruction to a power for good in our own day and for our children to come after us.

I now formally open the United States exhibit.

International Politics and the Preservation of Peace

by Under Secretary Herter¹

I regard it as a high honor to have been invited to share in your deliberations today. I have a close feeling of kinship with those who are professionally engaged in studying and in many cases practicing the art and science of politics for, as many of you know, I have had some years of service in this field.

We live in times which sorely tax the capacities of any political scientist, whether primarily concerned with domestic affairs or the international scene.

Circumstances change day by day and almost hour by hour, but our goals over the years have remained relatively constant.

If the fundamental policies of the United States with regard to other nations could be summed up in a single word, that word would be "freedom." Judge John Bassett Moore, in the very first pages of his classic work, *The Principles of American Diplomacy*, makes the following memorable statement:

Many nations have come and gone, and have left little impress upon the life of humanity. The Declaration of American Independence, however, bore upon its face the marks of distinction and presaged the development of a theory and a policy which must be worked out in opposition to the ideas that then dominated the civilized world. Of this theory and policy the keynote was freedom; freedom of the individual, in order that he might work out his destiny in his own way; freedom in government, in order that the human faculties might have free course; freedom in commerce, in order that the resources of the earth might be developed and rendered fruitful in the increase of human wealth, contentment, and happiness.

That statement is as sound today as when it was originally written in 1918.

¹ Address made before the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association at St. Louis, Mo., on Sept. 5 (press release 510 dated Sept. 4.)

Since those words were written, both the League of Nations and more recently the United Nations have epitomized the efforts of mankind to give institutional form to the protection of the right to freedom of individual nations. Today the United Nations represents the single best hope for the smaller nations of the world, but even in its own charter it has recognized that regional collective-defense agreements can be of value and that the right of self-defense is still an inherent right of every nation.

Near East Situation

Very recently the United States responded directly when the Government of Lebanon appealed for help² in the face of the threat to the independence and integrity of Lebanon aided and abetted from outside its borders and aggravated by the events in Iraq and Jordan. The urgency of the situation made it necessary to respond in this way rather than through the United Nations. Nevertheless, the United States immediately went to the United Nations and sought in the Security Council to find some international solution to the Lebanese problem that would make it unnecessary for United States troops to remain in Lebanon.³ As Ambassador Lodge made plain in the Security Council:

... we are the first to admit that the dispatch of United States forces to Lebanon is not an ideal way to solve present problems, and they will be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations can take over.

You know of the efforts made by the United States and by other members of the United Na-

² BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 181.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, p. 186.

tions to seek a way to bring this about. And you know how the Soviet Union blocked these efforts through its use of the veto in the Security Council.

It was in these circumstances that the matter was taken to the General Assembly where President Eisenhower presented his six-point plan for peace in the Near East.⁴ In the words of the President, this plan

... would provide a setting of political order responsive to the rights of the people in each nation; which would avoid the dangers of a regional arms race; which would permit the peoples of the Near East to devote their energies wholeheartedly to the tasks of development and human progress in the widest sense.

The President's speech before the third emergency special session of the General Assembly shows how a member nation in an international organization can suggest a positive and constructive course to the other members in a situation that causes concern to all without encroaching in the slightest way on the freedom of each member to act in the way it considers to be in its best interests. The President's speech is an example of statesmanship of the highest order.

Much of the President's program was reflected in the Arab-sponsored resolution that was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on August 21.⁵ However, the importance of that resolution lay principally in the fact that the countries involved directly in the controversy had themselves agreed on a formula for solution.

Now, it may be asked, in such a situation as that in Lebanon and Jordan why should the United States work through the United Nations? Why not choose the direct, simple way, unfettered by the complexities of multilateral diplomacy? The answer is simple. The day is gone when any great power, or even a group of great powers, for that matter, can take matters in its own hands to "solve" an international situation affecting others.

Prime Minister Nehru, in his recently published analysis of the world today, put it this way:

We have arrived at a stage in the modern world when an attempt at forcible imposition of ideas on any large section of people is bound ultimately to fail. In present circumstances this will lead to war and tremendous destruction. There will be no victory—only defeat for everyone.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 337.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1958, p. 409.

The world is a growing community of sovereign nations, and each has a responsibility for the peaceful solution of international problems wherever they may occur. The Near East problem is as much, perhaps more, a matter of concern to the small states as it is to the large powers. Small countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, will remain free and independent only through collective action. As was shown during the recent session of the General Assembly, statesmanship and leadership are by no means the monopoly of the few; they are, fortunately, shared by many.

Conflict in the Far East

Of a very different type from the Middle Eastern situation is the conflict now current in the Far East. Here, in effect, is an attack by Communist China, the rulers of which have not qualified for membership in the United Nations and who have been recognized only by 19 of the 64 nations of the free world. The Communist Chinese, for reasons still obscure, have resorted to force in an action which both they and Moscow allege to be for the liberation of Taiwan and the offshore islands. It is they themselves who indicate that the bombardment of Quemoy is only an incident to the larger purpose, knowing full well that we have a solemn treaty engagement to protect Taiwan against attack. It is significant to note that, in 54 of the 73 conversations held over the last few years in Geneva between Ambassador [U. Alexis] Johnson of the United States and Ambassador Wang of Communist China, we attempted to persuade the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area. Despite our persistent efforts they refused to agree and continued to proclaim their intention to seize Taiwan and the offshore islands, using force if necessary.

It is in this area of the Far East that eight nations have achieved their independence since the end of World War II. They and their neighbors are in a stage of momentous transition. Each is determined to guard its new-found freedom. All are waging vigorous campaigns against the inherited scourges of poverty and illiteracy and otherwise are seeking improved conditions of life. All are striving to develop the means of sharing the higher living standards modern science and technology have made available to the world.

The Far Eastern branch of international com-

munism, centered in the Chinese Communists, had significant success until 1954 in its drive to add Asian countries to its subjugated domain. Though they failed to get all of Korea because of prompt United Nations action inspired by the United States, or all of Indochina by reason of the Geneva accord of 1954, they nevertheless consolidated their power on the mainland of China and thus won a powerful base from which to threaten the other Asian nations.

Their military drive to extend their domain has been supplanted in the last 4 years by political, economic, and infiltration efforts. And these are both important and dangerous, while by nature less spectacular.

Free Asian nations are well aware of the threat posed by these new tactics. The new nations realize that the conspiracy seeks to engulf them while they are still young and relatively weak. Thus they are under great pressure to show evidence of rapid economic progress in a free environment as a psychological deterrent to the Communists' claim that their way is the fastest and surest path to an advanced status.

This sense of urgency is everywhere apparent in the Far East. It reinforces the natural drive of the new-found energies of peoples just emerged from colonial status. It is one of the considerations in formulating our own policies toward the Far East.

Our policy there basically has two parts. First, we are determined to deter, and where necessary to repel, Communist military expansion and infiltration by maintaining an adequately strong free-world military posture. The second part of our policy is to assist the Far Eastern free nations to achieve internal security and political stability and to promote improved conditions of life for their people. We have joined with them, in our mutual interest, to help create a framework in which free peoples can develop sound economies in a peaceful atmosphere.

Though the Communist emphasis in recent months has been more upon subversion and penetration through economic, political, and psychological channels, force has been their principal instrument of expansion in Asia. Therefore, their present resort to force must be looked at not alone in the light of Taiwan and the offshore islands but also in the real possibility of its extension to

these new nations of Southeast Asia as well as Korea.

Nor can we have any illusions that the actions of the Chinese Communists are in any way divorced from those of the Russian Communists. They are both dedicated to world domination, and both are linked by the principles of Lenin to which they give devotion and blind allegiance. Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants were trained in the classical methods devised years ago for world revolution. Mao asserts he looks to Moscow for leadership, and Liu Shao-chi's Chinese Communist textbook proclaims that all Communists have a duty to "transform the world into a Communist world."

The military attack now being perpetrated by the Chinese Communists in the Straits of Taiwan is a direct concern, as I have pointed out, to the free nations of the Asian mainland. However, it is also a great concern to the people of the Philippines. It was from us that they gained independent status and joined the group of newly free Asian nations after World War II. They won a bitter fight in their first years against the Communist-directed Hukbalahap attempt at infiltration; and, while the Philippine Government is now one of the strong elements in the SEATO defensive alliance, it could not help but be seriously affected by new Communist successes on the mainland.

Communist Goals and Methods

It is well known that the international Communists desire tensions. They thrive on trouble. To stir new anxieties in respect to the Taiwan Straits, therefore, is entirely in keeping with their methods.

They may very well feel that mankind is weary of the "China problem" and, in the notion the world has forgotten their armed attack upon the forces of the United Nations, are now using artillery barrages as a means of smashing their way once again into the limelight. They desire to be regarded as important and powerful.

The situation should confuse no one. It really is crystal clear.

The world's Communists have one goal: world domination.

The Chinese Communists have one goal: to dominate and control their Far Eastern neighbors.

The Communists' method: subjugation of free nations, one by one.

Their strategy: confuse, divide, and ultimately control those nations that employ the democratic process of discussion, disagreement, and compromise.

Their tactics: whatever is likely to be the most successful at the moment.

At this moment, perhaps, they think they can post threats to which we will not react; they think they can find a weak spot in the Taiwan Straits. In this they are likely to be greatly mistaken.

They are also greatly mistaken if they think the free world has lost sight of their ultimate goal and has come to confuse tactics with objectives.

Accomplishments of Free Nations

Happily, we can with good reason and without undue complacency point to some very real accomplishments of free nations. The nations of Western Europe have in the past 13 years given the lie to the Spenglerian thesis. The first phase of their postwar effort saw a phenomenal economic recovery, in which the yeast of dollar assistance was multiplied again and again to the point where these nations now invest more in their own defense each year than the entire \$13 billion we contributed over the 5-year span of the so-called Marshall plan. Today these nations are in their turn beginning to share with us in extending economic assistance to the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Almost simultaneously the people of Western Europe achieved the second phase of their recovery, an increased political stability, which has not only produced responsible and responsive governments but has steadily diminished the influence and subversive threat of indigenous Communist parties.

Not content with their success in achieving internal solvency and stability, Western European statesmen have had the courage and vision to break down many of the artificial barriers which for centuries kept them from realizing the full potential of this vast, rich area. Their cooperation was born in the dire realities of economic stagnation but has since moved with a sure and steady pace into collective defense and thence into nearly every important sphere of economic, social, and cultural life. Thus, the success of the Coal and Steel Community was largely responsible for the idea of the Common Market, now in the process of being estab-

lished. Already this commendable concept, which we have supported from the outset, is being enlarged to the bolder and more comprehensive scheme of the Free Market. Most recently our Congress approved legislation and the appropriation of funds to assist six Western European nations in the operations of EURATOM, looking toward the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

While this is an optimistic note, it does not for a moment suggest that all the problems of Europe are on their way to solution. I could expand on divided Germany or on the status of the satellites.

I could indulge in speculation with respect to present and potential problems in many quarters of the globe.

To do this, however, would merely begin a recitation of the difficulties daily encountered in the conduct of foreign affairs, difficulties which we would be only too glad to be free of but which have been thrust upon us because of our great material growth and strength and because of our dedication to that ideal of freedom which John Bassett Moore described so feelingly. It is truly an anomaly that a nation whose only selfish wish is to be left free to pursue its own internal development now finds itself, because of its dedication to an ideal, concerned with problems in almost every corner of the world. From the great talents that are represented in the group here assembled will, I am convinced, come the answers to many of these problems.

Chinese Refugees Gain Asylum in United States

The Department of State announced on September 12 (press release 532) that a group of 81 Chinese refugees would arrive at San Francisco on September 14, thus marking the increased momentum of visa issuance under the special act of September 11, 1957.

This legislation, which reflects wide congressional interest and support, provides for the admission to the United States of 14,556 refugees from the Middle East and countries under Communist domination. To date more than 10,000 of these visas have been allotted. The first was issued last October¹ to the mother of a former

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1957, p. 845.

north Korean jet pilot who won an award in 1953 by flying a Soviet-made MIG plane to south Korea.

The 81 refugees are terminating a journey which started when they escaped from Communist Chinese oppression. They were selected from applicants registered with Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, a private American voluntary organization, by a committee in Washington on the basis of the degree of hardship and persecution which they suffered, level of education, and contribution they could make to the welfare of the United States.

Included in the group are: Chan Yau Wau, a

distinguished physicist; Miss May Chin, a professor of mathematics who graduated from Indiana University; Herman Chiu, a chemical engineer who studied at the University of Michigan and Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Peter Y. H. Lim, an aeronautical engineer; Chu Nan Sung, a surgeon; Miss June Lim, an educator with a Doctorate of Education from Columbia University; and other highly educated and skilled refugees. Many of these people have lengthy histories of persecution at the hands of the Communists because of their Western orientation and training and have undergone years of hardship as refugees.

President Corrects Soviet Misstatements on Taiwan Situation

Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a White House statement on Premier Khrushchev's letter.

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated September 13

SEPTEMBER 12, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your letter of September 7. I agree with you that a dangerous situation exists in the Taiwan area.¹ I do not agree with you as to the source of danger in this situation.

The present state of tension in the Taiwan area was created directly by Chinese Communist action, not by that of the Republic of China or by the United States. The fact is that following a long period of relative calm in that area, the Chinese Communists, without provocation, suddenly initiated a heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy and began harassing the regular supply of the civilian and military population of the Quemoy. This intense military activity was begun on August 23rd—some three weeks after your visit to

Peiping. The official Peiping radio has repeatedly been announcing that the purpose of these military operations is to take Taiwan (Formosa) as well as Quemoy and Matsu, by armed force. In virtually every Peiping broadcast, Taiwan (Formosa) and the offshore islands are linked as the objective of what is called the "Chinese Peoples Liberation Army".

The issue, then, is whether the Chinese Communists will seek to achieve their ambitions through the application of force, as they did in Korea, or whether they will accept the vital requisite of world peace and order in a nuclear age and renounce the use of force as the means for satisfying their territorial claims. The territory concerned has never been under the control of Communist China. On the contrary, the Republic of China—despite the characterizations you apply to it for ideological reasons—is recognized by the majority of the sovereign nations of the world and its government has been and is exercising jurisdiction over the territory concerned. United States military forces operate in the Taiwan area in fulfillment of treaty commitments to the Republic of China to assist it in the defense of Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands. They are there to help resist aggression—not to commit aggression. No upside down presentation such as contained in your letter can change this fact.

¹ For U.S. statements of Sept. 4 and 6 on the situation in the Taiwan Straits, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1958, p. 445.

The United States Government has welcomed the willingness of the Chinese Communists to resume the Ambassadorial talks, which were begun three years ago in Geneva, for the purpose of finding a means of easing tensions in the Taiwan area. In the past, the United States representative at these talks has tried by every reasonable means to persuade the Chinese Communist representative to reach agreement on mutual renunciation of force in the Taiwan area but the latter insistently refused to reach such agreement. The United States hopes that an understanding can be achieved through the renewed talks which will assure that there will be no resort to the use of force in the endeavor to bring about a solution of the issues there.

I regret to say I do not see in your letter any effort to find that common language which could indeed facilitate the removal of the danger existing in the current situation in the Taiwan area. On the contrary, the description of this situation contained in your letter seems designed to serve the ambitions of international Communism rather than to present the facts. I also note that you have addressed no letter to the Chinese Communist leaders urging moderation upon them. If your letter to me is not merely a vehicle for one-sided denunciation of United States actions but is indeed intended to reflect a desire to find a common language for peace, I suggest you urge these leaders to discontinue their military operations and to turn to a policy of peaceful settlement of the Taiwan dispute.

If indeed, for the sake of settling the issues that tend to disturb the peace in the Formosa area, the Chinese Communist leaders can be persuaded to place their trust in negotiation and a readiness to practice conciliation, then I assure you the United States will, on its part, strive in that spirit earnestly to the same end.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT²

President Eisenhower received this morning from the United States Embassy in Moscow the text of a lengthy communication from Chairman

²Read to news correspondents at Newport, R.I., on Sept. 8 by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President (White House (Newport, R. I.) press release).

Khrushchev. After the President has had an opportunity to study it more fully, he will make such reply as seems appropriate.

The letter deals with the situation which has developed in the area of Taiwan (Formosa) and the Taiwan Straits. Mr. Khrushchev's communication calls this "a dangerous situation." The United States has already recognized the danger and hopes that it will be mitigated by resumption of the ambassadorial talks between the United States and the Chinese Communist regime.

The evident cause of the danger is the unprovoked military action taken by the Chinese Communists who, beginning August 23d, have been subjecting Quemoy to heavy artillery bombardment and harassing the regular supply of Quemoy with its population of some 125,000 persons. This military activity is proclaimed by the official Peiping Radio as being in order to take by armed force Taiwan (Formosa), as well as Quemoy and Matsu.

The President earnestly hopes that the Chinese Communist regime will not again, as in the case of Korea, use armed force to achieve territorial ambitions. That would be to defy the basic principles upon which world order depends.

The United States would welcome the Soviet Government's concerning itself with this aspect of the matter.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT

Unofficial translation

MR. PRESIDENT: I am addressing myself to you on a question of great importance which, we are sure, is now occupying the minds of all to whom the cause of peace is dear.

As a result of the policy being carried on by the USA in regard to China, and especially of the actions being undertaken at the present time by American Government in the area of the Chinese island of Taiwan and of the Taiwan Straits, a dangerous situation has arisen in the Far East. Humanity has again been put before the direct threat of the beginning of a military conflagration.

In this responsible moment, the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to turn to the Government of the USA with an appeal to show sense, not to permit steps which could entail irreparable consequences.

You well know, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union stands firmly on the position of the peaceful coexistence of all states, regardless of their social or state structure, and is in favor of not allowing the beginning of military conflicts, in order to assure conditions for a peaceful life

for peoples on the whole globe. I think no one will dispute that the principles of peaceful coexistence have already received broad international recognition, and it can be said that for the overwhelming majority of states, they are the basis of their relations with other countries.

Nevertheless, in the postwar years, as a result of the policy of the USA, a deeply abnormal situation has been continuously maintained in the Far East, the cause of which is the aggressive policy of the Government of the USA, a policy of war. The main reason for the tense and, it must be directly said, very very dangerous situation which has arisen is that the USA has seized age-old Chinese territory—the island of Taiwan with the Pescadores Islands—by force, is continuing to occupy these territories, cloaking this occupation with references to its support of the traitor of the Chinese people, Chiang Kai-shek, and is also trying to extend its aggression to the offshore Chinese islands.

As the Soviet Government has already stated many times in the organization of the United Nations, as well as in correspondence with the Government of the USA and governments of other powers, the situation is also inadmissible that a great state—The Chinese People's Republic—as a result of the position taken by the Government of the USA, is deprived of the opportunity to participate in the work of the organization of the United Nations, and is not represented in that organization, although it has a legitimate right to this.

You also know as well as I do that the Chinese state is one of the founders of the UN and that by force of that circumstance alone the existing situation is absolutely abnormal and deeply unjust in regard to the Chinese people.

The situation which has now arisen as a result of the actions of the USA in the area of the island of Taiwan and of the Taiwan Straits seriously disturbs the Soviet Government and the people. Indeed, I think, it will not be an exaggeration to say that it disturbs the whole world, every country, regardless of at what distance it is located from the Taiwan area. If you look squarely at the truth, you must acknowledge that the USA is trying to assume the functions of some sort of world gendarme in this area too. We think that for any state, regardless how strong and influential it is, to take such a role on itself is an unworthy affair for a civilized state and quite risky.

The Government of the USA is carrying out military demonstrations trying to prevent the liberation of Taiwan and to keep this Chinese island as its military base, aimed above all against the Chinese People's Republic, and also to hinder the lawful actions of the CPR directed at the liberation of the offshore islands on which Chiang Kai-shekists have ensconced themselves.

In the area of the Taiwan Straits, there is one of the strongest naval units of the American Navy—the Seventh Fleet of the USA. Hasty measures are being taken to strengthen this fleet, and military vessels and aviation are being transferred to the Far East from the USA, the Mediterranean Sea, and other areas. More than that, it has been announced that in the next few days "joint maneuvers" of the naval forces and marines of the USA and Chiang Kai-shek clique will be carried out in the Taiwan area, and that new contingents of American troops

are being transferred to Taiwan on this pretext. The question arises whether such actions in the present situation can be assessed as other than an open provocation. It seems to us that with the most indulgent approach no other evaluation can be given to these actions.

It must be said that, in general, the practice of urgently transferring naval vessels of the USA from one place to another has become a frequent phenomenon recently. In truth, by the direction of movement of the American Naval Fleet one can now judge almost without error to what place will be directed the spearhead of the next blackmail and provocations.

Very recently the world was a witness to similar demonstrations of the American Navy in the Mediterranean Sea when the armed intervention of the USA into Lebanon was carried out and when the Sixth Fleet of the USA held the capital of Lebanon, and indeed that whole country, under the muzzles of its guns. When today attempts are being made to rattle the saber and threaten China, then, it seems to us, one should not forget that China is not small Lebanon which recently fell victim to foreign intervention, which has met universal condemnation at the just concluded special session of the UN General Assembly. The great 600 million Chinese people are powerful and unconquerable not only for their inexhaustible resources, but also for their solidarity in support of the government, and are confidently and firmly moving on the path of the further development and strengthening of their country, the raising of their welfare, at which we, Soviet people, are truly happy and at which all those who wish the Chinese people well cannot but be happy. But I would want to emphasize not only this side of the matter, but also that China is not alone; it has true friends ready to go to its aid at any moment in case of aggression against China, since the interests of the security of People's China are inseparable from the interests of the security of the Soviet Union.

In connection with the practice of transporting war fleets and air units from one end of the globe to another, for example, the regions of the Near and Middle East, the Far East, Latin America etc. in order to bring pressure to bear here on some, there on other states and to attempt to dictate one's will on them, in general the question arises—isn't it time to finish with such actions which, it goes without saying, can in no way ever be recognized as normal methods in international relations. There arises the legitimate question—ought this not be discussed in the UN and a decision be adopted forbidding powers from employing such movement of its naval and air forces for purposes of blackmail and intimidation and to the effect that these forces would be held within the limits of their national frontiers. At the same time, in connection with the application of this kind of methods in the foreign policy of the USA, I would like to make one more remark. Does it not seem to you, Mr. President, that such transferring of military vessels now in one, now in another direction to a significant degree is now deprived of any sense—at least in the relations of states which have modern types of weapons at their disposal? I do not know what your military advisers tell you but it seems to us it must also not be unknown to them that

the epoch of the flourishing of the power of surface naval fleets is over, has gone into the past. In the century of nuclear and rocket weapons of hitherto unheard of power and speed of action, these once threatening naval vessels are fit, in essence, only for paying courtesy visits, giving salutes, and can still serve as targets for appropriate types of missiles. Perhaps this will wound the self-esteem of people who are closely connected with fleets but what can you do, it is impossible not to reckon with indisputable facts.

Nearly every day political and military leaders of the USA come out with threats addressed to People's China. Such and only such a meaning have the repeated statements of USA Secretary of State Dulles about the activities of the USA in the region of the Taiwan Straits and in particular the statement which he made in your and his name on 4 September. This statement cannot but evoke the most decisive condemnation. It represents an open attempt of crude and uncerecermonious trampling of the sovereign rights of other states. The Government of the USA having no rights for this permits itself arbitrarily to establish some kind of boundary of its interests and the sphere of operations of its armed forces on the territory of China. Such activities it is impossible to qualify otherwise than as aggressive, which undoubtedly will be condemned by all peoples.

It is impossible to evaluate differently as well the statement of the Government of the USA of 6 September.

The inciting statement of Minister of Defense McElroy draws special attention to itself in which are contained frank threats addressed to the Chinese People's Republic, and in which attempts are made to justify the aggressive activities of American armed forces in the Far East and in which the Chiang Kai-shek clique is taken under protection. And the commander of American armed forces on Taiwan Vice-Admiral Smoot has let himself go entirely and states the intention of the USA together with the Chiang Kai-shekists to inflict a defeat on Communist China.

Military leaders in the USA try even, with the tacit agreement of the American Government, to resort to atomic blackmail in relation to China, acting evidently still on inertia under the impression of the moods governing in Washington in that short period in the course of which the USA had at its disposal a monopoly of the atomic weapons. As is known, even at that time the policy of atomic blackmail did not have and could not have any success. Is it necessary to say that in present conditions when the USA has long not been the possessor of a monopoly in the field of atomic armaments, attempts to intimidate other states by atomic weapons are a completely hopeless business.

I speak about this because, as it seems to me, in the USA there are still people who do not want to part with the policy of threats and atomic blackmail although, it would seem, each day gives no little evidence that such a policy henceforth is doomed to failure.

One can with full confidence say that threats and blackmail cannot intimidate the Chinese people. This clearly follows also from the statement of the Premier of the State Council of the CPR Chou En-Lai of 6 September.

The Chinese people wants peace and defends peace but it does not fear war. If war will be thrust on China, whose people are full of determination to defend its rightful cause, then we have not the slightest doubt that the Chinese people will give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor.

The aggressive preparations of the USA in the Far East, judging by everything, are not limited only to the region of the Taiwan Straits. There are facts to the effect that encouraged and instigated by the United States Syngman Rhee again is preparing military provocations and declaring his intention to move "in a march to the North". Evidently someone in the US has definite plans once more to turn Korea into a field of bloody battle. It is not because, by the way, the Government of the USA so stubbornly refuses to withdraw its troops from South Korea? But it is impossible to permit a repetition of the Korean tragedy, and the criminal plots of the Syngman Rhee-ites must be stopped. There can be no doubts that if the Syngman Rhee-ites risk a repetition of their "march", then there awaits them the same fate which befell them when the Korean people and the Chinese people's volunteers inflicted a complete defeat on the aggressor and frustrated his plans. Of course responsibility for the provocation of Syngman Rhee lies entirely on the Government of the USA.

At the recently concluded special session of the UN General Assembly, you, Mr. President, spoke about indirect aggression. Allegedly threatening certain Arab states of the Near East on the part of other Arab states, and called for the condemnation of this non-existent indirect aggression. At the same time the United States itself is carrying out in the Far East not only indirect but also direct aggression, by having seized the Chinese island of Taiwan and by supporting the anti-national clique of betrayers of the Chinese people, harbored on this island under the protection of American weapons and making from there bandit sorties against China.

The dispatch of its armed forces to the region of Taiwan and the waters of the Pacific Ocean adjacent to it the Government of the USA usually seeks to justify with reference to some kind of "obligations" undertaken by it in relation to the "defense" of this region. But did the Chinese people ask the American Government to take on itself such an obligation, by referring to which it permits itself to hamper the realization by China of its sovereign rights in relation to Taiwan and other Chinese islands?

The American people in the past itself had to beat off attempts of foreign powers to interfere in its internal affairs and by force of arms to impose their will on it. It is well known that these attempts ended lamentably for those who undertook them. Would it not be right to draw the appropriate conclusions from this historical experience of the United States and end the policy of interference in the internal affairs of China? Indeed if national independence is dear to the American people, then why should it be less dear to the Chinese people, as well as to any other people?

It is possible you will find what I have said above as harsh. But I do not permit myself to agree with this. In this letter to you, as also on other occasions, I simply wish to express myself frankly and to emphasize the whole danger of the situation developing in the region of

Taiwan and the Chinese offshore islands as result of actions of the USA. If we were to hide our thoughts behind outwardly polite diplomatic formulations, then, I think it would be more difficult to understand each other. Moreover, we desire, that you, the Government of the USA and the whole American people with whom we wish only good relations and friendship should have a correct idea about those consequences which the present actions of the USA in the Far East might have. It would be a serious miscalculation if in the United States the conclusion were drawn that it was possible to deal with China in accordance with the example as it was done by certain powers in the past. Such kind of miscalculation might have serious consequences for the cause of peace in the whole world. Therefore let us introduce into the question full clarity because reservations and misunderstandings in such affairs are most dangerous.

An attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union. True to its duty, our country will do everything in order together with People's China to defend the security of both states, the interests of peace in the Far East, the interest of peace in the whole world.

Nothing would be further from the truth than an attempt to assess this, my message to you, as an intention to exaggerate unnecessarily and even more to utter some kind of threats. We desire only to draw your attention to the situation from which no one can escape—neither you nor we—if in the Far East the fire of war breaks out. We wish to find a common language with you with which to cease the present movement downward on the inclined slope, with which by the common efforts of the USSR, the USA, the Chinese People's Republic and other countries to remove the tension arising in the Far East, with which it might be possible to say that through united efforts a useful contribution was made in the interest of peace in the whole world. Of course to decide to "recognize" or "not to recognize" the Chinese People's Republic is an affair of the Government of the USA itself. In this connection it is possible only to remark that neither the very fact of the existence of the CPR as one of the great powers of the world, nor the role which this government plays in our time in international relations, is changed because of that. But at the present time in view of the policy which the Government of the United States follows in relation to China such a situation has arisen that the question of the relationship of the United States to China obviously extends beyond the framework of purely internal affairs of the United States.

A situation has arisen which involves the interests of many countries. The tension artificially maintained in view of the policy of the USA in the relations between the United States and China and even more such actions which the United States is undertaking at the present moment in the Far East will lead also to a straining of relations between all great powers—the founders of the UN. It is possible without exaggerating to say that the present policy of the USA in relation to China complicates the solution of many important international ques-

tions and in a serious form hampers the normal activity of the UN as an international organization called upon to guard the cause of peace. There is one Chinese state and it is located in China and nowhere else and Taiwan and the other Chinese islands where at the moment the Chiang Kai-shekists have ensconced themselves—these are a part of China.

Only the Government of China—in the capital of China—Peking and to which the many million Chinese people have entrusted the leadership of their country has the right and the real possibility to represent China in international relations. And only the unrealistic position of the Government of the USA which still prefers to close its eyes to the actual state of affairs in China, is a stumbling block, prevents the states members of the UN from taking the only correct decision—to throw out of this organization the political corpse of the Chiang Kai-shekist imposter and to grant the representatives of Great China their legal place in the UN. Who will deny that China is attempting to free its own territory which has been transformed into a military base of a foreign power and which has become a source of continual threat for peaceful life of the Chinese people?

China has the full legal right to take all necessary measures against the traitor Chiang Kai-shek. It is taking these measures on its own soil and is not sending its armed forces on the territory of other countries. These actions of the Chinese People's Republic represent only legitimate measures of self-defense, foreseen also by the Charter of the United Nations organization. Quite otherwise acts the Government of the USA which is trying to confer upon itself the right to send its armed forces thousands and thousands of kilometers from the USA for the retention of the Chinese islands seized by it. It is not by accident that even the allies of the United States in the military blocs quite loudly censure American policy in relation to China as unrealistic and dangerous.

I think that every person who displays a real anxiety for the fate of peace cannot but speak out for having an end put to that abnormal and dangerous situation which has developed as a result of the current political course of the Government of the USA in the Far East. For that, according to the conviction of the Soviet Government, above all it is necessary to give up the narrow and alien-to-all-reality approach to the great historical changes which have taken place in China, it is necessary to recognize the legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic and once and for all to cease the policy of provocation and blackmail in connection with the Chinese people.

In the Far East there can not be a stable peace until such time as the American Navy Fleet will be withdrawn from the Taiwan Straits, until American soldiers will leave the Chinese island of Taiwan and will go home. We are convinced that such an opinion is shared not only by the Soviet Union and other socialist states but also by all other countries for whom the cause of peace is dear in the Far East and in the whole world. Mr. President, concluding my present message to you, dictated by a sense of the great responsibility which lies

upon our countries for the preservation of peace in the whole world, I wish with all force to emphasize that whether peace will reign in the Far East or whether this region will continue to remain a dangerous hotbed of war will depend fully on the further actions of the Government of the USA. I should like to hope that you with the necessary understanding will apprehend the present message to you from the side of the Soviet Government. I permit myself to express also the confidence that this message will be correctly understood by all the American people which—we are convinced of this—like other peoples desire peace and do not desire war.

If the Government of the USA will take the road of respect for the legitimate sovereign rights of the great Chinese people then this doubtless will be regarded with satisfaction by all peoples as a serious contribution of the people of the United States of America to the cause of strengthening of universal peace.

Sincerely,

N. KHRUSHCHEV
September 7, 1958

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Date for Talks on Test Suspension

Following is an exchange of notes between the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. concerning negotiations for an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests.

U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 10¹

Press release 527 dated September 11

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, referring to the Ministry's Note of 30 August of this year, has the honor to state that the Government of the United States of America notes with gratification that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has agreed to the date of October 31, 1958 as proposed by the United States for the beginning of negotiations among representatives of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on the question of suspension of

¹ Delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office at Moscow on Sept. 10.

nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the Report of the Geneva Conference of Experts.² The United States further notes that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggests that these discussions be held in Geneva. The United States agrees to this location. The United States is informed by the Secretary General of the United Nations that conference facilities and secretariat services will be available at the Palais des Nations.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also proposes that a period of two to three weeks be set for the duration of the proposed discussions. The United States, of course, agrees that the negotiations should be concluded as quickly as possible, but believes that their importance requires the expenditure of whatever time may mutually be deemed necessary for their successful conclusion.

The Chairman of the United States Delegation to the conference will be Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, United States Representative on Disarmament.

With regard to the other issues raised in the note and those discussed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the statement attached to the note of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,³ the views of the United States Government are as set forth in the statement of President Eisenhower of August 22.⁴ The United States proposes that these issues be reserved for discussion at the meetings which will commence at Geneva on October 31.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 30

Unofficial translation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and referring to the Embassy's Note of 22 August this year has the honor to state that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is ready to start 31 October 1958 negotiations of representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and Great Britain with the aim of concluding agreement on cessa-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.

³ Not printed here.

⁴ BULLETIN of Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

tion forever of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons by states with establishment of appropriate control for fulfillment of such agreement. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the most convenient place for conducting such negotiations would be Geneva. To avoid the dragging out of negotiations it would be expedient to agree beforehand on limitation of their duration to a definite period. On its part, the Soviet Government purposes to set this period at two to three weeks.

Forwarded herewith is the text of the statement of the Chairman, Council of Ministers, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, N. S. Khrushchev, in which the point of view of the Soviet Government is set forth on questions touched upon in the statement of President Eisenhower of 22 August.

U.S. Urges Soviets To Respond to Note of July 31

U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 8¹

Press release 520 dated September 8

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the United States note of July 31, 1958,² regarding a study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack.

It is noted that while the Government of the U.S.S.R. has responded to the United States proposal for negotiations on a nuclear test suspension beginning October 31, it has not yet responded to the United States proposal for studies of the practical aspects of safeguards against surprise attack beginning the first week of October. The United States hopes that it may receive an early reply to its note of July 31, since it attaches great importance to the proposed study as an effective means of moving toward agreement on meaningful measures of disarmament. Because of the delay and the necessity for careful preparations if the proposed technical talks are to be of greatest value, the United States believes that the meeting originally proposed for the first week of October should now be scheduled at a later date about two months after a reply from the Soviet Government has been received.

¹ Delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sept. 8.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1958, p. 278.

U.S. Replies to Soviet Note on Balloons

U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 5¹

Press release 517 dated September 6

The Government of the United States acknowledges the receipt of the note of the Soviet Government of September 3, 1958, stating that several aerial balloons of American manufacture recently landed in the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States has investigated this matter and ascertained the following facts. In connection with a program designed to gather meteorological information on the earth's atmosphere, the Cambridge Research Center of the United States Air Force has launched from the West Coast of the United States a number of high-altitude weather research balloons to transit the United States during the first six months of this year. The plastic balloons carry scientific recording instruments, including cameras for photographing cloud formations and other weather phenomena. This program has been the subject of several public announcements and on July 25, the Cambridge Research Center stated that a few of these balloons were lost and had not been found.

In the light of the foregoing facts, the balloons referred to in the note of the Soviet Government may be among those unrecovered by the Cambridge Research Center. All equipment used for the meteorological scientific program of the Research Center was clearly marked and the finder was requested to inform the Center by calling its telephone number in Bedford, Massachusetts, indicated on a plaque attached to the side of each gondola. This method of identification has been helpful in the past in bringing about the return of the scientific recording instruments. If the equipment in the possession of the Soviet Government can be thus identified as the equipment described above, the United States Government requests that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly return this equipment through the American Embassy at Moscow in order that the data collected may be evalu-

¹ Delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sept. 5.

ated and made available for use throughout the world scientific community.

SOVIET NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 3¹

Note No. 49/OSA

SEPTEMBER 3, 1958

Unofficial translation

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state to the Government of the USA the following:

Recently in the air space of the Soviet Union there have been caught several balloons with apparatus hanging to them which includes automatic photographic cameras for aerial photography of localities, radio receivers and transmitters, etc. An examination of apparatus shows that it was manufactured in the USA and that the launching of balloons was carried out by the Air Forces of the USA. In particular this is evidenced by the marks on several parts of the apparatus.

As is known the Soviet Government in the past already addressed itself to the Government of the US with the demand to take the necessary measures to cease the launching of American balloons into the air space of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government pointed out then that the flying of American aerial balloons over the territory of the USSR represented a crude violation of the aerial space of the Soviet Union and was a violation of the universally recognized principle of international law according to which each state has full and exclusive sovereignty in relation to the aerial space above its territory.

Replying to the message of the Soviet Government on this question, the Government of the US declared in its note of February 8, 1956,² that it will take measures to prevent in the future the launching of aerial balloons which might fly over the territory of the Soviet Union.

In connection with the above the Soviet Government again protests to the Government of the USA against the launching of American balloons into the aerial space of the USSR and expects that from the side of the Government of the USA there will be taken immediate measures for the cessation of similar actions of the American authorities.

United States Asks U.S.S.R. and Iran for Information on Missing Plane

Press release 518 dated September 6

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

In connection with the disappearance on September 2, 1958, of an unarmed U.S. Air Force C-130 transport plane on a flight over Turkey, the U.S. Government on September 6 requested

² Handed to American Chargé d'Affaires Richard H. Davis at Moscow on Sept. 3 by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister G. N. Zaroubin.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 293.

the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Iran to furnish it with any available information regarding the plane and its crew of 17. The Turkish Government has been conducting a search for the missing plane and its crew from the time of its disappearance.

U.S. NOTE TO U.S.S.R.¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to communicate the following on instructions from its Government:

It has been ascertained that an unarmed United States Air Force C-130 transport plane on a roundtrip flight from Adana to Trabzon and Van, Turkey is missing. Departing Adana at 10:21 GMT on September 2, 1958, the aircraft was last reported over Trabzon at 11:42 GMT and is unreported at Van. A crew of seventeen was on board.

In view of the foregoing, the United States Government would appreciate receiving any information which might become available to the Soviet Government concerning the missing United States aircraft and its crew. A similar inquiry is being addressed to the Iranian Government.

United States and Cuba Sign Atomic Energy Agreement

Press release 522 dated September 9

The Governments of Cuba and the United States on September 9 signed a comprehensive agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy for power and research.

The agreement was signed for the United States by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., and U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioner Harold S. Vance, and for Cuba by Ambassador Nicolás Arroyo.

The agreement supersedes a research agreement with Cuba effective since October 10, 1957.² The new agreement will expand the scope of U.S. cooperation with Cuba by providing for the exchange of information on the development, de-

¹ Delivered at Moscow on Sept. 6.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3911.

sign, construction, and operation of experimental power, demonstration power, and power reactor as well as research types.

As part of the agreement the Atomic Energy Commission will sell or lease to the Government of Cuba up to a maximum of 700 kilograms of contained U-235 at an enrichment of up to 20 percent. In the event that Cuba decides to build a materials testing reactor the transfer of 8 kilo-

grams of reactor fuel at 90 percent enrichment in U-235 is authorized. This quantity of fuel would be used in a 20.5 EMW boiling water power reactor to be constructed in the Habana del Este area of Cuba.

The agreement, which runs for a 20-year term, will become effective after statutory and constitutional requirements of both Governments have been met.

The United Nations: The Road Ahead

by Francis O. Wilcox

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you again only 2 days before the opening of the 13th General Assembly.

Much of the United Nations present strength and vitality stems from the wholehearted support of the American Association for the United Nations and the other nongovernmental organizations which are represented here today. You have made an invaluable contribution through your efforts to promote a wider understanding among the American people of the importance of the United Nations in man's quest for a just and lasting peace. A broad public understanding of the organization and the major problems confronting it is essential to the United Nations if it is to function effectively. I congratulate you all on the achievements of your organizations in working toward this important objective.

The delegation which will represent us at the forthcoming session will be a source of strength for the United States.² Under the very able and resourceful leadership of Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Lodge the delegation will function as a representative group of American leaders. Its members will come from varying walks of

life—the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government, the law and the arts, and industry and labor. I have no doubt that this team will represent the interests of the United States productively and with vigor at the 13th General Assembly.

The United Nations as a Force for Peace

Since our last meeting here a year ago the United Nations has continued to prove itself an effective force for world peace. Grave international disputes which might have erupted into large-scale conflicts imposed severe strains on the organization. Nevertheless, it met these challenges with a sense of responsibility and moderation.

Nowhere has the United Nations been more deeply involved in preserving the peace than in the troubled Middle East. The Assembly's unanimous action at the recent emergency special session in the Lebanon-Jordan crisis³ has offered new opportunities, which we hope can be realized, to further the stability and the welfare of the nations in the area.

By their joint action the member states were able to reach agreement on three important propositions. They agreed that all members of the

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 14 (press release 536 dated Sept. 13).

² For a list of the U.S. representatives to the 13th General Assembly, see *BULLETIN* of Aug. 18, 1958, p. 294.

³ For text of the resolution adopted unanimously on Aug. 21, see *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1958, p. 411.

United Nations should act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states, of nonaggression, and of strict noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Secondly, they asked the Secretary-General to make practical arrangements which would help uphold the purposes and principles of the charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign troops from the two countries. Third, they requested the Secretary-General to consult with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab economic development institution.

The United States welcomes and supports the initiative of the Arab states in developing this formula. Scrupulously respected, such a formula can offer bright prospects for the future of the Middle East. It could be the harbinger of a new era.

I would be less than candid, however, if I did not remind you that concrete deeds are far more convincing than resolutions—even those that are approved by a unanimous vote. It remains to be seen whether the Arab states will justify the vote of confidence given them by the General Assembly and will work out their problems in a spirit of mutual cooperation and good will.

In this connection may I say just a word about the problem of indirect aggression. The immediate threat to world peace, it seems to me, does not lie in the possibility of an all-out armed attack launched by one country against another. It lies, rather, in the subtler methods of intrigue directed against free and independent states—propaganda warfare and subversion, which we have come to know as indirect aggression.

As times are new, so we must think and act anew. The United Nations must face up to this challenge of indirect aggression. If it does not do so, the integrity and independence of small states everywhere will be in jeopardy and the cause of peace may suffer a mortal blow.

Our own hopes for a new era in the Middle East were voiced by President Eisenhower when he presented to the General Assembly a comprehensive program designed to insure political stability and a rising standard of living for people in the area.⁴ In clear and eloquent phrases, President Eisen-

hower offered six basic proposals which would provide the framework for peace in the Middle East. I would like to recall them to you now:

First: The Assembly should determine means for insuring the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon.

Second: Adequate measures should be taken to preserve the peace in Jordan.

Third: The Assembly should take action to end the fomenting of civil strife in the area through inflammatory and subversive propaganda.

Fourth: Steps should be taken looking to the creation of a standby United Nations Peace Force.

Fifth: The Secretary-General should consult with the Arab nations regarding the establishment of a regional economic development institution which would speed up the improvement of the standard of living in the area.

Sixth: The states concerned might wish to call for a United Nations study of the flow of heavy armaments with a view to working out arrangements "under which the security of all these nations could be maintained more effectively than under a continued wasteful, dangerous competition in armaments."

With the adoption of the resolution which I described earlier, the emergency special session of the General Assembly took the first steps to implement President Eisenhower's proposals. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld has been visiting the Middle East and consulting with leaders of the Arab world on practical measures to carry out the terms of the United Nations resolution. We are awaiting his report to the General Assembly on the results of his mission.

I hope that the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will be able to take additional action to further the objectives of the program outlined by the President.

Issues Confronting the 13th General Assembly

Against this background, I would now like to review with you some of the major issues which will confront the Assembly during its forthcoming session.

The 13th General Assembly, in my opinion, could be one of the most important sessions in the history of the United Nations. Technologically, man is making steady progress in probing the mysteries of outer space and the harnessing of

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 337.

atomic energy. New political forces are at work stemming mainly from the evolving nationalism in Asia and Africa and the consequent emergence of many new states. A continuing development to reckon with is the increasing power of the Soviet Union. This increased power has permitted the men in Moscow to inject a more aggressive note into their foreign policy while simultaneously posing as the champions of peace.

All of these elements will inevitably have their impact on this General Assembly, but so also will the proposals and posture of the United States.

United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Emergency Force has clearly demonstrated that it is possible for a truly international force to assist in preserving the peace. In the case of the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon there have, of course, been limitations on the scope of its operations. The significant thing, however, is that United Nations presence in Lebanon has had a stabilizing effect and reduced the threat to the peace.

The President declared in his message to the General Assembly that countries whose independence is threatened should be able to get prompt and effective action from the United Nations in order to help them preserve their freedom. To this end he urged the Assembly to take action looking to the creation of a "standby United Nations Peace Force."

This General Assembly will undoubtedly give its attention to this problem. The Secretary-General, as you are aware, has conducted an intensive study of the possibilities of such a force for some time. While it would be inappropriate for me to go into details of such a plan, I would like to offer a few general observations.

When I refer to a United Nations Peace Force, I am not thinking of large armed contingents powerful enough to repel armed attack. As desirable as that might seem to many of us, it is not practicable at this juncture in world history. We must, therefore, think in more modest terms.

Our experience with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), and the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) has underscored the need for personnel available on short notice to deal with emergencies which may threaten the peace. When a na-

tion's freedom is in jeopardy, time becomes precious. As Secretary Dulles declared at the time of the debate on Lebanon and Jordan,⁵

The preferable solution would have been collective action of the world community represented by the United Nations. But that would have taken time.

Naturally, any United Nations standby peace force should be prepared to meet a wide range of situations. It should also be ready to move quickly. This would necessitate some kind of permanent staff in the United Nations Secretariat to act as a planning center. This is the first step that should be taken.

We recognize that there are many problems connected with the establishment of such a force, such as organization, control, and financing. However, we consider progress toward a standby United Nations force is highly desirable. In this connection the small powers can play a significant role. We hope, therefore, that the coming General Assembly session will achieve at least a modest beginning in this direction.

Hungary

The situation in the captive nations of Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary, is a continuing source of concern to all free men. The General Assembly in 1957, on the basis of a unanimous report of the United Nations Special Committee on Hungary,⁶ concluded that the present Hungarian regime had been imposed on the people of that country by the armed intervention of the U. S. S. R. and that the Kadar regime and the Soviet Union had subjected the Hungarian people to repressive measures. After condemning these actions, the General Assembly called on the Soviet Union and the Hungarian authorities to respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Hungarian people.⁷

On June 16, 1958, Moscow and Budapest announced simultaneously the secret trials and executions of former Premier Imre Nagy, former Defense Minister Pal Maleter, and two other leaders of the 1956 national uprising.⁸ As a result of this brutal action in defiance of world opinion and in

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1958, p. 409.

⁶ For text of final chapter of report, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1957, p. 62.

⁷ For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1957, p. 524.

⁸ For a Department statement on the executions, see *ibid.*, July 7, 1958, p. 7.

violation of the pledged word of the Hungarian authorities, the Special Committee made a further investigation. On July 14, 1958, in a special report,⁹ the Committee asserted that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its forces from Hungary and indicated that repression continues in that unhappy country.

The tragedy of Hungary has not been forgotten. In fact, the Hungarian question has been inscribed on the provisional agenda of the 13th Assembly. Thus, all member states will have an opportunity to consider the latest report of the Special Committee and determine what further steps can be taken to alleviate the plight of the Hungarian people. The United States will continue, in the United Nations and elsewhere, to focus attention on conditions in Hungary.

Disarmament

Now I would like to turn to an issue of vital importance to all mankind, namely, the question of disarmament.

Few will deny that the frightful new weapons which man's genius has produced can lead to his ultimate destruction.

I am sure that all of you are aware of the active concern and tireless efforts of the United States and its free-world associates to achieve progress in the field of disarmament. The key principle in our approach to the question of arms limitation and control is mutual inspection. It is clear that any disarmament agreement, however good in theory, would be ineffective in practice without a workable mutual inspection system.

One important aspect of this problem is the detection of nuclear explosions. As you know, substantial progress in this field was achieved at a recent conference of experts in Geneva. These experts, who represented both the West and the Communist bloc, reported that "the methods . . . available at the present time . . . make it possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low-yield explosions." They added that "it is technically feasible to establish . . . a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the worldwide suspension of nuclear weapons tests."¹⁰

⁹ U.N. doc. A/3849.

¹⁰ For text of the final report adopted by the conference of experts, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.

The studies represented in this report were exhaustive. They covered such complex matters as the recording of acoustic waves and radio signals, the use of radioactive debris, and even the detection of nuclear explosions at approximately 20 to 30 miles above the earth.

The conference report includes a detailed description of the technical requirements for a workable control system. For example, a proposed network of control posts would include from 160 to 170 land-based posts and about 10 more on ships. Of these, about 100 to 110 of these posts would be located on continents, 20 on large islands, and 40 on small ones. The posts would be located throughout the world in North America, Europe, Asia, Australia, South America, Africa, Antarctica, and elsewhere.

The experts concluded their report by recommending this control system for consideration by governments.

This conference represents a significant step forward in the necessary preparatory work for a meaningful disarmament agreement. It could set the stage for a real breakthrough in the quest for disarmament, for which so many have been hoping.

Now the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to begin *political* discussions next month on the possibilities for suspending nuclear tests.¹¹ We hope the talks will produce concrete results.

Another area in which we might anticipate progress relates to safeguards against surprise attack. The Soviet Union responded favorably to President Eisenhower's initiative of last April suggesting that qualified experts meet to study the technical aspects of this problem. No date has yet been set for these talks. Last week we called on the Soviet Union for a final response on this matter and suggested a meeting about 2 months following the Soviet reply.¹² If discussions take place and are successful, another important milestone will be passed on the path to effective arms control.

The United States looks forward to the discussions on test suspension which are scheduled to begin on October 31 in Geneva. Our approach will be cooperative and constructive. This Assembly can help to carry forward the momentum toward agreement developed in recent days. As a mini-

¹¹ For texts of U.S. and Soviet notes, see p. 503.

¹² For text of U.S. note of Sept. 8, see p. 504.

num, the Assembly ought to give its moral support to the upcoming talks and urge the achievement of a meaningful agreement as soon as possible. If the Assembly can avoid an acrimonious debate, if it can encourage the parties to find common ground, then the forthcoming Geneva talks can begin in a most favorable climate.

Outer Space

Any discussion of disarmament naturally raises the problem presented by man's ventures into outer space.

Developments in the field of outer space affect all mankind. Our scientists tell us, for example, that artificial satellites reporting back to earth will enable us to explore the mysteries of the universe for the first time unimpeded by the distortion of the earth's atmosphere. Newly gained knowledge of the behavior of the sun and of interference with radio communications will be acquired. Improvements in means of communication may be possible by using satellites as radio relay points. Radio communication free of atmospheric and ionospheric disturbances will be possible—and between the most distant points on earth. Worldwide television will be possible. Air safety and navigational methods now unimagined will become realities. There could be incalculable improvement in weather forecasting through the study of cloud patterns on a planetary scale. The use of space platforms may even make weather control a possibility. The new knowledge may revolutionize medicine, nutrition, agriculture, and numerous other fields associated with man's welfare.

Therefore we believe the United Nations should take immediate steps to prepare for a constructive and fruitful program of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space even before agreement respecting military use of outer space is reached. Certainly, we do not wish to repeat our experience in the field of atomic energy in which failure to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament delayed for a considerable period the development of an international program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We are therefore pressing forward with proposals for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

As Ambassador Lodge announced in his address to the American Legion on September 2,¹³ we have

requested that the problem of outer space be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly. We shall seek action by the Assembly to pave the way for a realistic and effective United Nations program of international cooperation.

The Assembly can move forward in this vital matter by establishing a representative committee to make detailed studies and recommendations as to specific steps the United Nations can take to promote and assure the peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all mankind.

We are convinced that more progress can be made in the peaceful use of outer space if it is separated from the highly contentious and complex issue of disarmament. We made a similar separation in 1953 when President Eisenhower called for the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency without awaiting a disarmament agreement.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

My remarks on the need for a United Nations program to promote the peaceful uses of outer space naturally raise questions as to their progress on the international control of atomic energy resources.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, which was established nearly a year ago in Vienna, is now a going concern. Its General Conference will meet for its second session on September 22.

This organization has already begun its primary task of promoting the international sharing of benefits of atomic energy. Significant steps have been taken or are under way to this goal. For example:

A mission sponsored by the IAEA has already visited 17 countries in Latin America in an effort to determine training requirements in the peaceful application of atomic energy and is now preparing to report on its findings.

The Agency has 140 training fellowships available for this academic year for training scientists. A similar number is contemplated for next year. Ten students under this program are now arriving in the United States from various countries throughout the world for a course of study at the International School of Nuclear Sciences and Engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory.

A panel of experts has prepared a manual on safe practices in the use of radioisotopes. A sur-

¹³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 448.

vey of the possibility of standardizing terminology in nuclear physics on an international basis is under way. An international catalog of radioisotopes is being prepared.

From the forthcoming General Conference we are anticipating further proposals for advancing the Agency's program. The President has appointed John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, as head of our delegation. This reflects the firm support of the United States Government for the new Agency.

The IAEA promises great benefits for the future. But these will not come immediately or without effort. The Agency is only at the beginning of its task. Its accomplishments must now, therefore, be on a modest scale. Precisely for this reason I am convinced that your organizations can serve an important purpose in developing support for the Agency during this formative period. The concept of international cooperation to build a better world from the peaceful atom is, and will remain, a great challenge to us all.

The Second Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy just concluded in Geneva has increased the sentiment for close international cooperation in this vast new area which man is beginning to master. For example, the exciting prospect of tapping the tremendous power of thermonuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was opened when the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union announced that the results of their experiments in this field would be declassified and made available for the benefit of all mankind.

The Far Eastern Situation

All of us are deeply concerned over the grave situation created by the current aggressive Chinese Communist military actions in the area of the Taiwan Straits. Certain basic facts must be borne in mind in any consideration of this situation, in which the real issue is the Chinese Communists' attempt to realize through the use of force their political objectives. These facts are:

—The Communist objective is not the offshore islands; they have stated repeatedly that these small islands are only steppingstones to their major objective, the seizure of Formosa, which is a vital link in the free world's defense system in the Far East.

—The present hostilities were initiated by the Chinese Communists, without provocation.

—Neither Taiwan nor the islands under attack have ever been under Chinese Communist authority.

—The United States is bound by treaty to assist Taiwan against armed attack.

—If the Republic of China were to abandon the offshore islands, the Chinese Communists would not abandon their determination to use force to seize Taiwan.

Moreover, if the offshore islands were to fall into Communist hands through force, the Communists would feel confirmed in their belief that aggression pays. They would be encouraged to seek more by the same means. And their influence in Asia would be greatly enhanced.

The issue is clear: For the United States it means a firm stand in defense of the fundamental principle of the United Nations that force shall not be used to achieve political objectives. There is a much better way than resorting to force to settle such differences as these. Negotiation is the way. The United States will seek to follow the path of peaceful negotiation. For this reason our Ambassador in Warsaw [Jacob D. Beam] has been instructed to be ready to meet with the Chinese Communist representative. The past record of the Chinese Communists around the conference table gives no cause for optimism. Nevertheless, the resumption of ambassadorial talks could lead the way out of the present difficulties in the Taiwan Straits area.

It will be necessary, however, for the Chinese Communists to act like law-abiding members of the world community, something which they have been unwilling to do up to now.

Each member of the United Nations obviously has a strong interest in the situation in the Taiwan Straits area since Communist activities there are fraught with danger to all of us and to world peace. As the President said,

If the bilateral talks between Ambassadors do not fully succeed, there is still the hope that the United Nations could exert a peaceful influence on the situation.¹⁴

I am sure all of us here and in the United Nations will be watching the situation closely in the coming critical days.

¹⁴ For text of a report to the American people by President Eisenhower on Sept. 11, see p. 481.

We can expect renewed efforts by the Soviet Union to obtain a seat in the United Nations for Communist China. The United States, however, will continue its firm support for the seating of the Republic of China as the only lawful representative of the Chinese people. Last year our position was upheld by a vote of 48 to 27 in the General Assembly. I believe the Assembly will again support this policy.

Our position on this question is crystal clear. Time and again, Congress, aware of the aggressiveness of Communist China, has unanimously opposed in various joint resolutions the seating of the Peiping regime in the United Nations. Red China is now under indictment by a United Nations resolution for its aggression in Korea. It still occupies North Korea in defiance of the United Nations. It is now engaging in aggressive action in Taiwan Straits. Our policy stems from a basic conviction that recognition of Red China would materially assist the Chinese Communists' efforts to extend their hegemony throughout Asia. Current developments support this conviction.

Other Issues

So far I have dealt mainly with political issues. However, we must not forget the important role which the United Nations plays in other areas.

This review of the issues confronting the forthcoming Assembly would not be complete without paying tribute to the United Nations activities in the economic and social field. The United Nations continues to press ahead with efforts to help raise living standards and generally advance the social well-being of mankind.

Of course, I would not argue that it is just as important for the Universal Postal Union to assure the delivery of our letters in faraway places as it is for the Security Council or the General Assembly to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. But I think we can all take an honest pride in the steady progress the United Nations and its specialized agencies are making in combating disease, poverty, ignorance, and hunger in many lands.

The Economic and Social Council recently adopted a resolution requesting the General Assembly to urge member governments to continue their contributions to the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and provide for its gradual

expansion. We will exert every effort in support of such General Assembly action this fall. Our Congress has authorized a total contribution to both the Special Projects Fund and ETAP of up to \$38 million. In addition, we can expect that other members will contribute about \$30 million. This will assure the start of a financial base for the future development of these imaginative and forward-looking plans.

In the coming session the United States will support wholeheartedly the recommendation for establishment of the newly created Special Projects Fund. This fund will help further to expand United Nations activities in the technical assistance field. The resolution embodying the proposals not only provides for the establishment of the fund but contemplates an increase from \$30 million up to \$100 million in the funds available for extension of United Nations technical assistance activities. The fund will make possible surveys of water, mineral, and potential power resources; the staffing and equipping of training institutes in public administration, statistics, and technology; and the setting up of agricultural and industrial research and productivity centers.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We hope that the General Assembly will take special cognizance of this anniversary of the adoption of the declaration. The Human Rights Commission and the Assembly's Social Committee are continuing their efforts to combat those basic social problems which produce instability and tension. Progress in this area, however, is hampered to a large extent by the fact that millions of people are still deprived of basic human freedoms. Nevertheless, the educational value of the Declaration of Human Rights has proved far greater than was originally anticipated. This supports the view of our Government, namely, that progress in this field can best be achieved through educational processes rather than by formal treaty obligations.

Substantial progress is being made in the trust territories under the aegis of the Trusteeship Council. The United Nations is providing valuable assistance and guidance in the transition of trust territories to self-government or independence.

Togoland, which has been under French administration, achieved a substantial degree of self-

government in the past 2 years. Last April the people of Togoland held an election of deputies to a new chamber. It was conducted under United Nations supervision. The opposition parties, campaigning for looser ties with France and ultimate independence, scored a decisive victory. Now, the United Nations is awaiting a formal expression of the newly elected Chamber's views on the Territory's future. I am convinced that Togoland's future will be worked out in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Governments and peoples of Togoland and France—as well as the United Nations election supervisor and his staff—are to be congratulated on the conduct of this election.

Somaliland has different and very serious problems. It will become independent in 1960 by a decision of the General Assembly taken several years ago. We have assured the Somalis of our continuing interest in assisting them after they achieve independence. In addition to the familiar difficulties which confront all new countries, it has been plagued with chronic budgetary difficulties and a boundary dispute with Ethiopia. It is particularly important that these problems be resolved before the United Nations responsibility terminates. Therefore, we shall continue to urge both sides to achieve an early solution to the boundary dispute in line with United Nations recommendations.

The Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly must face once again the problem of rising costs. The total appropriation for last year was \$55 million. By the time the forthcoming Assembly completes action on all the items before it, we expect that the total appropriation will exceed last year's by several million dollars. Our own estimated contribution may amount to about \$20 million or 32.51 percent of the total amount. This percentage is the same as that of last year, but it represents a decrease from earlier years when we contributed as high as almost 40 percent of the total budget. This decrease is in line with the General Assembly's action last year which accepted the principle of 30 percent as the maximum share to be paid by the largest contributor (the United States) to the United Nations budget. The Assembly's first step in this direction was to reduce the percentage assessment of the United States from 33½ percent to 32½ percent this year.

Now, some people complain that our contribution to the United Nations is too high. To be sure the cost of peace is high, but it is far less costly than the terrible cost of a nuclear war. The dollars we put into the United Nations are certainly a small price to pay in terms of benefits which mankind derives from that organization.

Concluding Comments

In conclusion, I would like to outline some of the things I hope the General Assembly may achieve at its current session.

First: I hope that the deliberations of this Assembly will serve to reduce current international tensions and promote peaceful adjustments of international differences.

Second: I am hopeful that further steps will be taken to implement the various elements of the President's proposals for peace and progress in the Middle East.

Third: The Assembly should give urgent consideration to steps looking to the creation of a United Nations standby peace force. Such a force could make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of the United Nations machinery for peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Fourth: A committee should be established by the Assembly to explore constructive steps which the United Nations might take to promote the peaceful uses of outer space.

Fifth: I hope the Assembly will lend its moral support to the forthcoming technical talks in Geneva and assist in this way in maintaining the forward momentum we have gained in the disarmament field.

Sixth: The Assembly should continue its persistent quest to advance the economic and social well-being of mankind. The lessening of economic and social unrest and the advancement of dependent peoples aid immeasurably in laying the foundations for peace.

It is true that the United Nations has not always responded to man's high hopes. There have been failures to reach solutions to international difficulties in accordance with the principles of the charter. Obviously an organization so young in years is bound to have limitations. We must recognize these limitations and increase our efforts to make the United Nations an even more effective organization than it is today.

Despite its limitations, the fact remains that the United Nations has served as an indispensable force for world peace. It has provided a forum in which nations can air their grievances. It has achieved pacific settlement of many grave issues which might have exploded into war. It has frustrated Communist designs to mislead the world.

On one thing I am certain. It is essential that we and the other members of the United Nations never give up the quest for a just and lasting peace. We must never give in to despair; we must never permit ourselves to become fatalistic about the prospects of war.

Thucydides reminds us that fatalism tends to

produce what it dreads, for men do not oppose that which they consider inevitable.

We can only speculate on what might have happened to mankind had the United Nations not existed during these past 13 years. For my part, I am convinced that, if the nations of the world had been without a place to air their grievances and adjust their controversies under a code of international behavior, our civilization might well have been destroyed in a nuclear war.

The United Nations was created for the purpose of advancing international peace and well-being. It has no other goal. These purposes are identical with the objectives of American foreign policy. The circumstances demand that we continue to give the United Nations our full support.

The Challenge of the Times

by G. Frederick Reinhardt
Counselor¹

I can speak about CARE from first-hand knowledge. It was my privilege to be the United States Ambassador to Viet-Nam at the time that country became an independent Republic in October 1955. You may recall that, as a result of the war in Indochina, Viet-Nam was divided into a Communist-controlled north Viet-Nam and a south Viet-Nam that cast its lot with the free-world community of nations. This division and Communist oppression in the north created an immense problem for the young Republic in that, long before the Republic was proclaimed, refugees by the tens of thousands had been pouring into south Viet-Nam from the north. The number of these refugees eventually reached the staggering total of 750,000, which is almost as many people as live here in the District of Columbia. These people were destitute with little more than the clothes on their back; and one-third of them were children.

CARE airlifted itself into this chaotic situation without a moment's hesitation. The first call was for penicillin and drugs to prevent smallpox,

cholera, and other epidemics. Coinciding with this went an appeal for food and clothing. The American people responded with typical generosity. Literally thousands of lives were saved, and CARE became a most respected word in Viet-Nam.

This, however, was only the first phase—the emergency phase—of CARE's work in Viet-Nam. When the dangers of disease and starvation had been conquered, CARE actively participated in the program of resettlement and rehabilitation. Hand tools, ploughs, handicraft kits, fishing gear, mosquito netting, livestock, and many other simple necessities were purchased with CARE funds and distributed to the refugees and needy citizens of this infant Republic. CARE then gave them the wherewithal to start life anew. They seized it eagerly and gratefully.

When I arrived in Saïgon early in 1955, the CARE mission in Viet-Nam had established a working relationship with the authorities in Saïgon that seemed equal to any stress or strain. I was tremendously impressed with the skillful and effective way CARE people get things done. And so, 3 years later, I am particularly gratified to have this opportunity again to express my personal

¹Address made before the meeting of the Board of Directors and National Advisory Council of CARE at Washington, D. C., on Sept. 4 (press release 511).

appreciation and my congratulations to the CARE organization for its accomplishments in Viet-Nam. If CARE's accomplishments in Viet-Nam are typical, and I have no doubt they are, CARE is doing a wonderful job for the United States abroad.

Turning to another area of the world which is of particular importance today, CARE has, in cooperation with various agencies of the United States Government, extended assistance to Egypt using surplus agricultural commodities made available under title III of Public Law 480. In fiscal year 1956 this program, the largest operated by CARE at that time, included the distribution of milk powder, butter, oil, and cheese to almost 3 million persons. Included in this total was a school-lunch program for feeding 1,900,000 school children. More recently CARE assistance has been made available through special programs at Gaza and Port Said. In addition, approval has also been given for the resumption of a modest program, based upon a CARE proposal submitted to ICA, involving distribution of upwards of \$8 million worth of surplus foodstuffs for use in an Egyptian school-lunch program to be operated by the U.A.R.-Egyptian authorities with the cooperation of CARE. The inauguration of this new program is an additional demonstration of the efforts of your organization, in collaboration with the United States Government, to assist other countries of the world in adequately meeting their urgent requirements of the most essential foods.

Cooperation Between ICA and CARE

I would like to speak for a few minutes this evening on the broader program of the United States Government in helping less developed peoples of the world. As you are well aware, this effort is centered principally in the United States mutual security program.

Yet perhaps not all of you appreciate the close cooperation that exists between the International Cooperation Administration, which administers the mutual security program, and CARE. For more than 10 years CARE has been registered with the ICA as a volunteer agency eligible for official support.

This status entitles CARE to draw on United States surplus food stocks in helping the needy overseas, and it empowers ICA to pay the ocean-freight charges in getting CARE packages and

CARE food to needy people. In the past 5 years more than \$500 million worth of surplus foods of all kinds have been used to assist CARE and other voluntary agencies in the job that they are doing.

CARE's work in effect makes an important contribution to our national policy, for the United States is today embarked on a worldwide effort to achieve peaceful progress by helping other nations improve their standard of living. Since World War II—and perhaps because of it—we have recognized the fact that nations are interdependent and that in our shrunken world democratic prosperity cannot coexist with poverty.

This philosophy is not merely based on fear of Russian missiles or atomic bombs. We had charted our course and were following it before the Soviets achieved a nuclear capability. It rests on the acknowledgment of a kinship between the man in the rice paddy in Burma and the man on the assembly line in Detroit. We have accepted the fact that peace is more difficult, more uncertain, if whole areas of the world face a future filled with despair.

Let me be more specific. Since World War II some 20 new independent states have come into being. Seven hundred and fifty million people live in these countries, or about one-fourth of the world's total. Each one of these countries has emerged from colonial status which in their own minds they look back upon as "colonial servitude."

This has resulted in an intense spirit of nationalism, coupled with a distrust, and more, of the Western World in general. This distrust is frequently not understood in the West and often gives rise to misunderstandings. Nevertheless it exists, must be recognized and dealt with.

Offsetting this distrust is the intense desire of these young nations to achieve a better standard of living and to do it quickly. They want to attain overnight what has taken older countries generations to achieve. They will not take "no" for an answer, and they are not prepared to accept a gradual approach, even when proposed by their own leaders. These leaders are on trial before their own people. As events in the Middle East have shown, this court of public opinion is a very severe judge.

This desire to escape centuries of disease, poverty, ignorance, and despair is one of the most powerful forces in this large underdeveloped portion of the world today. It has been called the

"revolution of rising expectations." It is exploited by our enemies with bland promises and offers of aid that they always describe as "without strings."

The problem facing the United States is simple: Will these newly developing nations succumb to the blandishments of the materialist system developed by 40 years of communism? Though inhuman, antireligious, and tyrannical, it has produced a remarkably rapid industrial revolution. And this, let us face it, has immense appeal to them. Or will they seek the way to economic well-being more slowly and without doing violence to individual liberty and political democracy which Western civilization has painfully evolved through centuries of effort? This is the challenge of the times.

No single country has the wealth alone to underwrite the economic development of these nations of the world. If the free world is to win this economic struggle, it must be a cooperative undertaking with many nations combining their efforts.

We have begun to recognize this principle and are putting it into effect. Last week, five governments and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed on a \$350-million aid plan to keep India's development program moving. This is the largest multination economic aid plan ever arranged for an underdeveloped country. It is a tremendously encouraging step.

Helping Others To Help Themselves

The United States is the most industrialized nation in the world. The less developed nations seek desperately the knowledge of industrial techniques and machinery and equipment which they cannot make for themselves. This is an area where we must accept leadership.

And it is in this direction that the mutual security program is directing its offensive. We are working with the less developed nations in an effort to help them help themselves. They need higher levels of health, education, sanitation. They need nurses, doctors, teachers, engineers, administrators. They need to learn new methods of agriculture, of irrigation, of conservation. We are sending hundreds of technicians to share our knowledge with these peoples; and we are bringing thousands of citizens of these countries to the United States to teach them how to go back to their country and demonstrate new, better meth-

ods of mining, engineering, nursing, education, and administration.

Our new weapon in this struggle is the Development Loan Fund. Congress appropriated \$300 million last year and \$400 million this year for this fund. Already applications are on hand for more than \$2 billion in long-range economic projects. This fund does not compete with the Export-Import Bank or with any other lending institution. It is a bank of last resort. It lends money for specific, long-range economic growth projects, such as port facilities, essential roads, improved power systems, railways, communications, and other developmental projects which, though economically sound, cannot obtain financing elsewhere.

Another feature of the United States mutual security effort that is attracting increasing attention is the investment guaranty program. I think that all of us recognize that, in the long run, private risk capital is the soundest way to develop a young country. This was the way the United States grew. A few weeks ago the United States passed the \$200-million mark in its program to guarantee private investors against expropriation or losses through inability to transfer funds from foreign currencies into dollars.

The investment guaranty program has sparked a new phase in private investment. Fifty years ago the American company planning an investment overseas insisted on owning 100 percent of the stock in the foreign venture. Twenty-five years ago a few daring souls decided that 51 percent might be safe, with nationals of the home country having the minority stock interest. More recently some American companies have tried ownership on a 50-50 basis. Today, interestingly enough, we find many companies reluctant to go into a new country unless the citizens of that country are interested enough to risk more than half the capital.

In some quarters our mutual security program is criticized as a "giveaway" and that it is all money "down the rathole." Yet this is apparently not a purely American phenomenon. The story has been brought back from Moscow that an American of Russian extraction returned to the Soviet Union this summer to visit his small hometown. The improvement in living conditions impressed him, but he found the townspeople grumbling and discontented. When he remarked

on the relative plenty in food and consumer goods, an acquaintance replied: "Sure, but look at all the money the Government's wasting on foreign aid."

U.S. No Longer Has Monopoly

It is true we no longer have the monopoly of foreign aid. The Soviets have taken a page from our book and have twisted our ideas to suit their own nefarious ends. This policy is now followed with efficiency and as usual with disregard for the truth. Soviet aid is exclusively in the form of loans, and they have yet to adopt a grant program. These loans, with their low interest rates, long-term repayment plans, and absence of controls appeal to underdeveloped countries and are accompanied by great fanfare. This program has been actively pursued. In the last 4 years Soviet loans have passed the \$2 billion mark, and the number of loan and trade agreements signed during this same period is up to 98. The net result is that Soviet-bloc trade has doubled from 1954 to 1957.

The Communists are seeking respectability, an entree, a chance to weaken the influence of the United States, and an opportunity to penetrate weaker countries. Here is a statement made by a Soviet delegate to the Afro-Asian conference in Cairo last fall:

We do not seek to get any advantage. We are ready to help you as brother helps brother, without any interest whatever, for we know from our own experience how difficult it is to get rid of need.

I think the martyrs of Hungary bear silent witness to the tragedy of believing this fraternal offer. The people of Poland, too, know that getting rid of the Communists is more difficult than getting rid of need or hunger.

The challenge of the Soviet economic offensive appears more dangerous than the military challenge. I believe Khrushchev knows no one will win a nuclear war.

Our task is to bring into the struggle not only our resources and abilities but our faith and patience as well. We need the sum total of our energies in this battle. We need to draw on two qualities that America has in full measure—stamina and endurance.

This politico-economic struggle will not be decided this year or next. It is going to be with us for a good many years to come. We must search for better methods; we must marshal the

efforts of the United Nations and the free-world countries. We must raise our sights.

The mutual security program for the coming year will cost each one of us little more than 5 cents a day. The total cost of the program is less than one-fourth of what we spend each year on liquor and tobacco. It is less than one-half of one percent of our gross national product.

I think it is high time that we fully appreciate the importance of our efforts to help the world's less privileged people. I know of nothing that we do as a people that reflects more directly the moral character and destiny of this great nation than the United States mutual security program.

At the same time we cannot afford to be complacent or indifferent to the needs of our allies. Our own security is inextricably bound up with that of other free nations. We must continue to wage this economic war with all the ingenuity that our inventors, our scientists, our doctors, our businessmen, and such voluntary agencies as CARE can command.

To CARE's mission chiefs I would say: You are in the front line of this struggle. Your dynamic spirit, faith, and dedication are helping to develop the feeling of brotherhood among the peoples of the free world that is the hope of humanity.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

16th Session of the ECE Timber Committee

The Department of State announced on September 3 (press release 506) the designation of George Corydon Wagner, Sr., vice president and treasurer of the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company of Tacoma, Wash., a division of the St. Regis Paper Company, as the U.S. delegate to the 16th session of the Timber Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), scheduled to convene at Geneva October 13-17.

The committee, which is one of the principal committees of ECE, provides a forum where experts in the field of timber may meet periodically to consider and discuss matters of common interest. Discussions in the coming session will primarily concern a market review and prospects for sawn softwood, small-sized roundwood, and sawn

hardwood; a proposal of the Soviet Union for a draft all-European agreement on scientific, technical, and economic collaboration in the timber industry; and several reports of working parties.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Session, 2d Session

Recruitment and Training for the Foreign Service of the United States. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3552, a bill to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. May 27, 1958. 81 pp.

A Review of the Relations of the United States and Other American Republics. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June 3-July 31, 1958. 267 pp.

Denial of Passports to Persons Knowingly Engaged in Activities Intended To Further the International Communist Movement. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 13760 and other bills relating to the issuance of passports. July 16-August 18, 1958. 150 pp.

United Nations Emergency Force. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 367 and H. Con. Res. 373, relative to a permanent United Nations force. July 24 and 25, 1958. 102 pp.

Eighth Semiannual Report on Activities Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as Amended. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the report outlining operations under the act during the period January 1 through June 30, 1958. H. Doc. 431, August 5, 1958. 67 pp.

Message from the President of the United States returning without approval the bill (H. R. 11581) to remove wheat for seeding purposes which has been treated with poisonous substances from the "unfit for human consumption" category for the purposes of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, and for other purposes. H. Doc. 441, August 20, 1958. 2 pp.

California International Trade Fair and Industrial Exposition. Report to accompany H. J. Res. 658. S. Rept. 2484, August 20, 1958. 1 p.

Denial of Passports. Report to accompany H. R. 13760. H. Rept. 2684, August 21, 1958. 11 pp.

Extension and Amendment of Public Law 480. Conference report to accompany S. 3420. H. Rept. 2694, August 22, 1958. 10 pp.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Opened for signature at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847. *Adherence deposited:* El Salvador, August 14, 1958.

Germany

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London

February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.

Accessions deposited: Netherlands (for territory in Europe only), August 1, 1958; Austria, August 20, 1958.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Accession deposited: Belgium, including the Belgian Congo and the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, June 30, 1958.

BILATERAL

Cuba

Research and power reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy, and superseding research reactor agreement of June 26, 1956 (TIAS 3911). Signed at Washington September 9, 1958. Enters into force on date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Denmark

Agreement amending research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 25, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3309 and 3758). Signed at Washington June 26, 1958.

Entered into force: September 8, 1958 (date on which each Government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

France

Agreement relating to the establishment of an armed forces radio network in Metropolitan France. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris August 30 and September 6, 1956, with related note of September 6, 1957. Entered into force September 6, 1956.

Agreement modifying the agreement relating to the establishment of an armed forces radio network in Metropolitan France. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris July 7 and 18, 1958. Entered into force July 18, 1958.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet

Press release 508 dated September 3

The Department of State announced on September 3 the convening of the Twelfth Selection Boards, which will review the records of all career Foreign Service officers for purposes of promotion and selection out. The Selection Boards are established by the Secretary of State under the terms of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.

Selection Boards, which normally meet once

¹ Not in force.

each year, are composed of senior career Foreign Service officers and distinguished private citizens. The Boards are given the task of evaluating the performance of Foreign Service officers as the basis for the President's promotion of the top officers in each class.

The task confronting the Selection Boards this year has grown in scope, owing largely to the increase in the size of the Foreign Service Officer Corps by virtue of the recent integration program. As a result of this program the Foreign Service Officer Corps has expanded from 1,300 in 1954 to approximately 3,400 this year.

The Selection Boards will meet for approximately 4 months. The Boards include 28 active Foreign Service officers; 6 public members drawn from private life; and 2 observers on each board, 1 designated by the Department of Commerce and 1 by the Department of Labor. Participation by these observers represents the direct interest of their Departments in the work of the Foreign Service of the United States.

The Foreign Service officer members include five career ministers:

James C. H. Bonbright, Ambassador to Portugal
Herbert S. Bursley, Chief, Career Development and Counseling Staff, Department of State
Homer M. Byington, Jr., Ambassador to Malaya
Vinton Chapin, Ambassador to Luxembourg
Julian F. Harrington, Ambassador to Panama

The public members are:

Ross N. Berkes, Los Angeles, Calif.
Walter J. Bierwagen, Cheverly, Md.
Clement D. Johnston, Roanoke, Va.
Charles C. O'Day, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Peterson, Washington, D. C.
Eugene S. Williams, Baltimore, Md.

Foreign Service Examination Postponed to December 1959

Press release 523 dated September 9

The Department of State announced on September 9 that a written examination for Foreign Service officers of class 8 will not be held in December of this year and that the next such examination will be scheduled for December 1959. The Department reported that the decision not to hold an examination during the current year is based on the fact that a sufficient number of candidates are now available to fill such vacancies as are likely to occur during the next 18 months.

September 29, 1958

Application blanks for the December 1959 written examination will be available from the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C., after April 1, 1959.

Designations

Woodbury Willoughby as Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, effective August 25.

Charles W. Adair as Director, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective September 2.

William J. Sheppard as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, effective September 7.

Tremper Longman as International Cooperation Administration Liaison Officer attached to the Consulate General at Salisbury, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, effective June 6. (For biographic details, see press release 531 dated September 12.)

Elevation of Consulate at Zagreb, Yugoslavia

Department mailing notice dated September 10

On August 1, 1958, the American consulate at Zagreb, Yugoslavia, was elevated to the rank of Consulate General. Edward P. Montgomery has been assigned to the post as Consul General.

Consular districts in Yugoslavia are not affected by the change in status.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

The Role of the United States in World Affairs. Pub. 6669. General Foreign Policy Series 128. 27 pp. 25¢. Another issue in the popular *Background* series, this pamphlet points out the role the United States is playing in world affairs today.

Disarmament—The Intensified Effort, 1955X58. Pub. 6676. General Foreign Policy Series 131. 65 pp. 30¢.

This publication records U.S. efforts to negotiate a sound and safeguarded agreement on the regulation, control, and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Sample Questions From the Foreign Service Officer Examination. Pub. 6681. Department and Foreign Service Series 80. 36 pp. Limited distribution.

This pamphlet presents samples of the kinds of questions

which will be asked in a Foreign Service officer written examination.

Statistical Review of East-West Trade, 1956-57. Pub. 6684. General Foreign Policy Series 132. 34 pp. Limited distribution.

Eleventh semiannual report to Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 for the period July 1-December 31, 1957.

The International Atomic Energy Agency—The First Year. Pub. 6696. International Organization and Conference Series I, 37. 33 p. 20¢.

A pamphlet outlining the origin, organization, and general operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its first year of existence.

Program for the Near East. Pub. 6697. International Organization and Conference Series III, 130. 20 pp. Limited distribution.

An address given by President Eisenhower to the U.N. General Assembly on August 13, 1958, explaining U.S. action in the Near East and proposing solutions to Middle Eastern problems.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4042. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ceylon—Signed at Washington June 18, 1958. Entered into force June 18, 1958.

Foreign Service Personnel—Free Entry Privileges. TIAS 4043. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and El Salvador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 18 and May 9, 1958. Entered into force May 9, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4045. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima April 9, 1958. Entered into force April 9, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4046. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Poland, amending agreement of February 15, 1958. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 6, 1958. Entered into force June 6, 1958.

Mutual Recognition of Ship Measurement Certificates. TIAS 4047. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Yugoslavia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 12 and 16, 1958. Entered into force June 16, 1958.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 4050. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru, amending agreement of December 27, 1946. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington April 24 and May 28, 1958. Entered into force May 28, 1958.

Defense—Aerial Refueling Facilities. TIAS 4051. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Canada. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ottawa June 20, 1958. Entered into force June 20, 1958.

Financial Assistance—Facilities for Inter-American Conference. TIAS 4052. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 27, 1958. Entered into force June 27, 1958.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance. TIAS 4054. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Morocco, supplementing agreement of April 2, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rabat May 19, 1958. Entered into force May 19, 1958.

Correction

BULLETIN of September 22, 1958, p. 462: The third name in the list of Western experts at the Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests should be spelled "Sir John Cockcroft."

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 8-14

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to September 8 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 506 and 508 of September 3, 510 and 511 of September 4, and 517 and 518 of September 6.

No.	Date	Subject
*519	9/8	Maryland company gets investment guaranty in Italy.
520	9/8	U.S. note to U.S.S.R. on prevention of surprise attack.
†521	9/9	Visit of Turkish Finance Minister.
522	9/9	Power reactor agreement signed with Cuba.
523	9/9	Foreign Service examination canceled for 1958.
524	9/9	Dulles: news conference.
*525	9/9	Educational exchange (Lebanon).
†526	9/9	Visit of Indian Finance Minister.
527	9/11	U.S. note to U.S.S.R. on suspension of nuclear weapons tests.
†528	9/11	U.S.-Japanese talks.
*529	9/12	American composers to visit U.S.S.R.
*530	9/12	Swearing in of delegation to 10th General Conference of UNESCO.
*531	9/12	Longman designated ICA liaison officer at Salisbury (biographic details).
532	9/12	Chinese refugees arrive in U.S. under special immigration law.
†533	9/12	Talks with Japanese Foreign Minister concluded.
†534	9/12	U.S. transport plane crashed in Soviet territory.
†535	9/13	Economic discussions with Turkey.
536	9/13	Wilcox: "The United Nations: The Road Ahead."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Republics. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 9	485
Asia	
Communist Threat to Peace in Taiwan Area (Eisenhower)	481
International Politics and the Preservation of Peace (Herter)	494
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 9	485
Atomic Energy	
President Opens U.S. Exhibit on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	493
United States and Cuba Sign Atomic Energy Agreement	505
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Date for Talks on Test Suspension (texts of U.S. and Soviet notes)	503
China, Communist	
Chinese Refugees Gain Asylum in United States	497
Communist Threat to Peace in Taiwan Area (Eisenhower)	481
International Politics and the Preservation of Peace (Herter)	494
President Corrects Soviet Misstatements on Taiwan Situation (Eisenhower, Khrushchev)	498
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 9	485
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy	518
Cuba. United States and Cuba Sign Atomic Energy Agreement	505
Department and Foreign Service	
Designations (Adair, Longman, Sheppard, Willoughby)	519
Elevation of Consulate at Zagreb, Yugoslavia	519
Foreign Service Examination Postponed	519
Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet	518
Disarmament. U.S. Urges Soviets To Respond to Note of July 31 (text of U.S. note)	504
Economic Affairs	
Mr. Bullis To Be Chairman of IDAB	493
16th Session of the ECE Timber Committee (delegate)	517
Europe. 16th Session of the ECE Timber Committee (delegate)	517
India. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 9	485
International Organizations and Conferences. 16th Session of the ECE Timber Committee (delegate)	517
Iran. United States Asks U.S.S.R. and Iran for Information on Missing Plane (text of U.S. note)	505
Middle East	
International Politics and the Preservation of Peace (Herter)	494
The United Nations: The Road Ahead (Wilcox)	506

Military Affairs. United States Asks U.S.S.R. and Iran for Information on Missing Plane (text of U.S. note)	505
Mutual Security. The Challenge of the Times (Reinhardt)	514
Presidential Documents	
Communist Threat to Peace in Taiwan Area	481
President Corrects Soviet Misstatements on Taiwan Situation	498
President Opens U.S. Exhibit on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	493
Publications. Recent Releases	519
Refugees. Chinese Refugees Gain Asylum in United States	497
Science. U.S. Replies to Soviet Note on Balloons (texts of U.S. and Soviet notes)	504
Treaty Information	
Current Actions	518
United States and Cuba Sign Atomic Energy Agreement	505
U.S.S.R.	
President Corrects Soviet Misstatements on Taiwan Situation (Eisenhower, Khrushchev)	498
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Date for Talks on Test Suspension (texts of U.S. and Soviet notes)	503
United States Asks U.S.S.R. and Iran for Information on Missing Plane (text of U.S. note)	505
U.S. Replies to Soviet Note on Balloons (text of U.S. and Soviet notes)	504
U.S. Urges Soviets To Respond to Note of July 31 (text of U.S. note)	504
United Nations	
International Politics and the Preservation of Peace (Herter)	494
The United Nations: The Road Ahead (Wilcox)	506
Yugoslavia. Elevation of Consulate at Zagreb, Yugoslavia	519

Name Index

Adair, Charles W.	519
Bullis, Harry A.	493
Dulles, Secretary	485
Eisenhower, President	481, 493, 498
Herter, Christian A.	494
Khrushchev, Nikita	498
Longman, Tremper	519
Montgomery, Edward P.	519
Reinhardt, G. Frederick	514
Sheppard, William J.	519
Wagner, George Corydon, Sr.	517
Wilcox, Francis O.	506
Willoughby, Woodbury	519

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